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INTRODUCTION
The year of 1997 presented the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit with the opportunity to consider a variety of
trademark-related issues, both procedural and substantive. The
court's decisions provide trademark practitioners with critical
guidance on a number of fronts. Among the year's highlights, the
court addressed the quantum and nature of use necessary to support
registration under the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988.' It also
reviewed the scope of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's (the
"Board") authority to issue sanctions against uncooperative and
obstructive participants in inter partes proceedings. In two separate
decisions, the court considered the scope of arguments permissible in
an ex parte proceeding,3 and in another, it affirmed a Board decision
addressing the registrability of single-color marks in the wake of the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.'
As in prior years, Board decisions fared better than district court
decisions in appeals to the court. Whereas Board decisions were
upheld in more than two-thirds of the cases appealed to the court,
more than fifty percent of district court decisions were either partially
or completely reversed.
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ADDRESSES SOME PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The court reviewed the Board's likelihood of confusion analysis in
several cases, paying particular attention to the weight properly
afforded to each of the factors described in In re E.L DuPont
DeNemours & Co.
5
1. See Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3946-48 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1994)); see also discussion infra Part 1.C.
2. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
3. See discussion infra Part IA3.
4. 514 U.S. 159,34 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1161 (1995); see infra Part II.D.
5. 105 F.3d 1405, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (establishing precedential
factors of consideration for approving registration); see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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A. Appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
1. A request for remand
In In rejaume Serra, S.A., 6 the Federal Circuit granted an applicant's
request to remand two cases to the Board following the applicant's
successful cancellation of a registered mark which was cited by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), and later by the Board,
as a bar to registration of the applicant's two marks. Serra's two
applications were refused registration by the PTO, and subsequently
by the Board, under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act7 based upon a
finding of likelihood of confusion with a pre-existing registered
mark." Serra initiated an action before the Board to cancel the cited
registration while simultaneously appealing to the Board on the
refusal to register his two marks. Although the existence of the cited
registration was clearly a critical factor in both of Serra's appeals, it
neglected to notify the Board of the concurrently filed and related
cancellation proceeding, and likewise failed to move the Board to
suspend his appeals during the pendency of the cancellation action.
Serra's appeals concluded unfavorably before the ruling in the
cancellation action was issued. The Board upheld the PTO's refusal
to register Serra's marks citing the same registered mark. Serra
subsequently appealed the Board's refusal of registration to the
Federal Circuit prior to the Board's ruling in his cancellation action.
The Federal Circuit dismissed Serra's two appeals without
prejudice to reinstatement pending a final disposition in the
cancellation action Upon the successful cancellation of the cited
registration, the court granted Serra's request to remand his
applications to the Board for a further registrability determination on
the ground that the basis for the PTO's refusal of registration no
longer existed." The PTO either failed to oppose, or refrained from
opposing, applicant's motion to remand his appeals. 2
Although the ultimate result-namely, reevaluation of the
registrability of Serra's marks following the removal of the sole bar to
their registration-was undoubtedly appropriate, the convoluted
6. 107 F.3d 30, Nos. 95-1308, 95-1309, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1782 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13,
1997) (unpublished table decision) (granting an unopposed motion to remand trademark
registration cases to the PTO because the basis for its refusal to register trademark had been
removed).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994).
8. See Dupont, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1782, at *1.
9. See id. at *1.
10. See id. at *1.
11. Seeid. at*1.
12. See id. at *1-2.
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path of Serra's appeals was unquestionably at considerable cost both
to the limited time and resources of the Board and the Federal
Circuit. A timely filed motion to suspend would have achieved the
same result without requiring the Board or the Court to waste time
on unnecessary, and ultimately moot, appeals.
2. Appealability of a refusal to disqualify counsel
In Frankenmuth Fundraising Corp. v. Commissioner of Patents &
Trademarks,' the Federal Circuit concluded that the PTO's refusal to
disqualify counsel in a trademark opposition proceeding is an
interlocutory decision that cannot be appealed until the Board enters
a final decision. 4
During the pendancy of the trademark opposition proceeding,
Frankenmuth filed a petition to disqualify the opposing party's
counsel, whose petition, and subsequent request for reconsideration,
were both refused. 5 Frankenmuth based his appeal to the Federal
Circuit on 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (4) (B), which grants the court
jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks ("Commissioner") and the Board "'with respect to
applications for registration of marks and other proceedings as
provided in Section 21 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C.
1071).'" 6 Frankenmuth claimed that his appeal fit into an exception
13. No. 97-1576, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36202 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 10, 1997) (unpublished table
decision) (dismissing on procedural grounds the Commissioner's appeal of the decision not to
disqualify party's counsel).
14. See id. at *2 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 (1981)).
In Firestone the Supreme Court held that an interlocutory decision by a district court declining
to disqualify counsel was not appealable before a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See
Firestone, 449 U.S. at 379. Section 1291 indicated that "courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Id. at 369 n.1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1994)). The Firestone Court recognized that certain orders made before a final judgment on
the merits may be appealable when they: (1) conclusively determine the question in dispute,
(2) "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action[,]" and (3)
are "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." See id. at 375 (quoting Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)) (footnote omitted). Such an appealable order
prior to a final judgment on the merits constitutes a final "collateral order." See id. The Court
determined, however, that an order deciding whether to disqualify counsel would rarely
constitute an unreviewable final judgment on the merits. See id at 377. As a result, the Court
held that such an order was not appealable under Section 1291 before a final judgment. See id.
at 375.
15. See Frankenmuth, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36202, at * 1 (describing the facts of the case).
16. Id. at *2-3 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (4) (B) (1994)). Though 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a) (4) (B) provides the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from
decisions of the Commissioner as set forth in Section 21 of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15
U.S.C. § 1071 (1994), Section 21 lists only a few situations where applicants may appeal a
Commissioner's decision to the Federal Circuit:
An applicant for registration of a mark, party to an interference proceeding, party to
an opposition proceeding, party to an application to register as a lawful concurrent
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to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's "nonappealability of
interlocutory decisions."'7
Following a 1969 decision from the United States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, the court rejected Frankenmuth's argument,
ruling that Section 21 of the Trademark Act limits the Federal
Circuit's appellate jurisdiction over Commissioner decisions to two
narrowly enumerated scenarios. According to the Frankenmuth court,
appellate jurisdiction is permitted when the Commissioner
determines that an affidavit of continuing use under 15 U.S.C. § 1058
is insufficient,' or when the Commissioner concludes that a
trademark renewal application under 15 U.S.C. § 1059 is incomplete
or defective.' 9 Because Frankenmuth's appeal did not involve a
decision relating to an affidavit of either continuing use or renewal,
the Federal Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack ofjurisdiction .2
3. Attacks on registrations not permissible in ex parte actions before the
Board
In two separate decisions, the Federal Circuit emphasized that ex
parte proceedings are improper venues for lodging collateral attacks
against third-party registrations.
In In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc.,2t the Federal Circuit considered an
user, party to a cancellation proceeding, a registrant who has filed an affidavit as
provided in Section 8[], or an applicant for renewal, who is dissatisfied with the
decision of the Commissioner of Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, may appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit....
15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (1) (1994).
17. See Frankenmuth, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36202, at *2.
18. See id. at *3 (discussing situations in which Federal Circuit court would have
jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 1071 over appeal from decision of the Commissioner in a
trademark proceeding). Section 1058 of Tile 15 concerns the duration of trademark
registrations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (1994). Among other things, Section 1058 provides that a
certificate of registration remains in force for ten years. See § 1058(a). However, the
Commissioner will cancel the registration if, within one year preceding the expiration of six
years from the date of registration, a registrant fails to file in the PTO an affidavit
demonstrating that the goods or services related to the subject trademark or indicated in the
registration are in current use, or that any non-use results from special circumstances without
intent to abandon the mark. See § 1058(a). Such an affidavit is termed in the statute an
"affidavit of continuing use." See id.
19. See Frankenmuth, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36202, at *3. Section 1059 of Title 15 provides
for the renewal of trademark certificates of registration. See 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (indicating the
period of renewal and time for renewal of trademark certificates of registration); id. § 1059(b)
(stating that the Commissioner must notify a registrant if the Commissioner declines to renew a
registration); id. § 1059(c) (recognizing that renewal applicants not domiciled in the United
States are subject to and must comply with the resident designation provision for service of
process and notices in 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (e)).
20. See Frankenmuth, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36202, at *3; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a)-(e)
(defining affidavit of continuing use or renewal).
21. 105 F.3d 1405,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming a Board decision
that affirmed a trademark examining attorney's refusal to grant a certificate of registration to
the mark because the mark was likely to cause confusion with a previously registered mark).
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appeal from a Board decision affirming the PTO's refusal to register
the mark "THE DELTA CAFE & Design" for "restaurant services
specializing in Southern-style cuisine" because it was likely to cause
confusion with the already registered mark DELTA for hotel, motel,
and restaurant services.22 The Board affirmed the PTO's refusal by
concluding that confusion between the two marks was likely on three
grounds: (1) the identical nature of the parties' services (i.e.,
restaurant services); (2) the fact that the dominant portion of Dixie's
mark, namely, the term "delta," was identical to the cited mark; and
(3) that the remaining elements that comprised Dixie's mark were
insufficient to distinguish the two marks.23 The Board explicitly
rejected Dixie's attempt to distinguish its services from those listed in
the cited registration on the ground that the registrant had not made
"significant use" of the DELTA mark for restaurant services. The
Board explained its obligation to restrict its likelihood of confusion
analysis solely to the description of services listed in the registration
and application. The Board emphasized that to do otherwise would
constitute an impermissible challenge to a registration.24 The Board's
refusal formed one basis for Dixie's appeal to the Federal Circuit.2
On appeal, Dixie argued that a registration's identification of
services constitutes prima facie, rather than conclusive, evidence of a
registrant's use of its mark for such services.2 6 According to Dixie, the
Board erred in giving conclusive weight to the inclusion of
"restaurant services" in the registration's identification of services
rather than relying upon declarations, submitted by Dixie,
confirming that the registrant had not used the mark to identify
22. See id. at 1405,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
23. See id. at 1406, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
24. See id. (noting the Board's conclusion that to investigate an issue of significant use of a
registered mark in deciding whether to grant an application for a new mark "would be to allow
an impermissible attack on the registration").
25. See id. Dixie also appealed on the basis that the Board failed to consider fully and
properly all of the factors that are relevant in determining whether the newly proposed mark
was likely to cause confusion with the registered mark. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533
(indicating that Dixie maintained that Board did not properly and fully address the thirteen
factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) to assist the PTO in determining whether the proposed new
mark is likely to cause confusion with an already registered mark); see also discussion infra Part
11A.1 (discussing the court's review of the Board decision on the likelihood of confusion issue).
26. See Dixie, 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534 ("Dixie argues that the board
erred in giving conclusive weight to the identification of services in the registrant's
trademark... [and] claims that the registrant's identification is merely prima facie evidence of
its use of the mark for such services .... "). The court recognized that Dixie's central contention
addressed the second of the thirteen DuPont factors, namely, "'the similarity or dissimilarity and
nature of the ... services as described in an application or registration or in connection with
which a prior mark is in use.'" See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d
at 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567).
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restaurant services. Dixie argued that these sworn declarations were
sufficient to overcome the rebuttable presumption that the cited
registration covered restaurant services.2
In its ruling, the Federal Circuit confirmed that a certificate of
registration serves merely as prima facie evidence of a registration's
validity and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered
mark in relation to services listed in the registration.2 ' The court
concluded, however, that Dixie's arguments amounted to a thinly-
disguised ex pane attack on the validity of the cited registration.2 The
court explained that although a prima facie presumption of validity is
rebuttable," an ex parte proceeding could never be the proper forum
to challenge the validity of a registered mark."
Faced with an analogous, though perhaps more novel, argument in
In re Darren Rittenhouse,2 the court applied the same reasoning as in
Dixie." Rittenhouse likewise involved an appeal from a Board decision
27. See id.; see also id. at 1408, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534 (citing Dan Robbins & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Questor Corp., 599 F.2d 1009, 1014, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 100, 105 (C.C.PA. 1979)
(ruling that a prima facie presumption of a trademark's validity may be rebutted)).
28. See id. at 1407,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1994)).
29. See id. at 1408,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534.
30. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534-35 (citing Dan Robbins, 599 F.2d at 1014, 202
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 105). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), a certificate of trademark registration
constitutes prima facie evidence of the registrant's validity:
A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal by this chapter shall be prima
facie evidence of the validity of the registration, registrant's analysis of the mark, and
of registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the
certificate, subject to any conditions and limits stated therein.
15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1994). A party challenging the validity of a registration may do so under
certain circumstances by initiating a cancellation proceeding. See § 1064 (listing circumstances
under which party may petition to cancel trademark registration). One seeking such a
cancellation must be able to rebut the prima facie presumption of a registration's validity by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Dan Robbins, 599 F.2d at 1014, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 105
(citations omitted). The Dan Robbins court affirmed the Board's denial of an application to
register the mark "LIL TINKER," as well as the Board's dismissal of the party's counterclaim
seeking cancellation of the "TINKERTOY" mark registration. See id. at 1013-15, 202 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 105-06 (affirming the dismissal of a cancellation counterclaim because the claimant
had not proved by a preponderance of evidence that the registered trademark had become a
common descriptive name, and sustaining the denial of the application because there was a
likelihood of confusion between the proposed and registered marks).
31. See Dxie, 105 F.3d at 1408, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534-35 (citing Cosmetically Yours,
Inc. v. Clairol Inc., 424 F.2d 1385, 1387, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 515, 517 (C.C.PA 1970) (holding
that an applicant may not prove abandonment of a registered mark in an ex parte registration
proceeding)); In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596, 598, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278, 280 (C.C.PA
1971) (holding that applicant's argument that its use predated registered mark constituted as
improper collateral attack on the validity of registration that should have been made in formal
cancellation proceedings); TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 1207.01 (c) (v)
(Jerome Gilson ed., 2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter TMEP] (stating that applicants will not be heard
on matters constituting collateral attack during ex parte prosecution); 3 J. THOMAS McCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23.24[1] [c] (3d ed. 1996).
32. 124 F.3d 228, No. 97-1252, 1997 WL 556298 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 9, 1997) (unpublished
table decision).
33. See id. at *2 (holding that ex parte proceedings are attacking the validity of
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affirming the PTO's refusal to register appellant's mark on likelihood
of confusion grounds. 4 Rittenhouse sought registration of a stylized
"O's" mark for "clothing, including T-shirts, hats, caps, jackets, and
sweatshirts." 5  The examining attorney refused registration for
Rittenhouse's mark, citing a series of six registered marks covering
identical or nearly identical goods owned by the Baltimore Orioles
Limited Partnership. 6 On appeal, Rittenhouse challenged both the
Board's findings of likelihood of confusion as well as the underlying
validity of the cited registrations. 7 Rittenhouse argued that "because
professional baseball is not considered commerce for purposes of the
antitrust laws, baseball clubs are also not engaged in interstate
commerce sufficiently to benefit from the federal trademark laws.""
The Federal Circuit's response was twofold. First and foremost, the
court agreed with the Board and PTO that Rittenhouse's interstate
commerce argument was merely an impermissible ex parte attack on
the validity of the Orioles' registered marks39 The court cited its
recent holding in the Dixie case for the proposition that "the present
ex parte proceeding is not the proper forum for such a challenge."40
Having disposed of Rittenhouse's argument procedurally, the court
nevertheless addressed the merits of Rittenhouse's interstate
commerce challenge.4 1 The court pointed to the Supreme Court's
express acknowledgment that "[p]rofessional baseball is a business
and it is engaged in interstate commerce"42 to emphasize that the
Baltimore Orioles, like other professional baseball clubs, were clearly
entitled to the protection of the federal trademark laws.
registrations).
34. See id. at *1; see also infra Part IIA (describing the likelihood of confusion analysis in
Dixie). The examining attorney also refused registration of Rittenhouse's mark pursuant to
section 1052(a) of the Lanham Act. See id. at *1. Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a) (1994), states that a trademark registration may be refused if it "[consists of...
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter;, or matter which may disparage ... persons...
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute." The
Court disposed of the case on alternate grounds and thus did not address section 1052(a) of
the Act. See Rittenhouse, 1997 WL 556298, at *1 n.1.
35. See Rittenhouse, 1997 WL 556298, at *1 n.1.
36. See id.
37. See id.; infra Part IIA1 (providing a thorough discussion of the court's likelihood of
confusion analysis).
38. Rittenhouse, 1997 WL 556298, at *2.
39. See id.
40. Id. (quoting In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
41. See id.
42. Id. (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1971) (noting that baseball's current
exemption from federal antitrust laws is nothing more than an "aberration")).
1498
TRADEMARK DECISIONS
B. Appeals from the Federal Courts
1. Jurisdiction of Federal Courts over settlement agreements
In National Presto Industries, Inc. v. Dazey Corp.,43 the Federal Circuit
considered the scope of a federal court's jurisdiction over issues
arising out of the interpretation of a settlement agreement between
National Presto and Dazey resolving a lawsuit previously brought
before the court.
44
The initial action between the parties for design patent and trade
dress infringement culminated in a settlement agreement delineating
future design and color requirements for Dazey's frying pots.4
Concurrently, the parties entered into an independent consent
judgment permanently enjoining Dazey from selling the allegedly
infringing model of pot, "or any colorable imitations or facsimiles
thereof."4 6 The consentjudgment, however, failed to incorporate the
settlement agreement or any of its terms.
47
Following Dazey's release of the new pot design and National
Presto's protests that the design violated the settlement agreement,
Dazey filed an emergency motion, as part of the original lawsuit,
seeking a declaration that its new pot complied with the terms of the
settlement agreement.48  When the district court ruled in favor of
National Presto, Dazey appealed to the Federal Circuit.49
Immediately after Dazey filed its appeal, the Supreme Court issued an
opinion addressing generally the power of district courts to interpret
and enforce settlement agreements." The Federal Circuit remanded
the case to the district court for reconsideration of its jurisdiction in
light of this new Supreme Court precedent. 1 On remand, Dazey
43. 107 F.3d 1576, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The court affirmed the
district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action seeking a declaration of its rights under an
agreement which concluded previous litigation with defendant for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See id. at 1583,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
44. See id. at 1577,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
45. See id. at 1577-78, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (stating Dazey's newly designed "Quick
Fry" pot could not be black, and its lid must cover certain bright metal trim to avoid infringing
National Presto's rights).




50. See id (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1996)
(holding that the court has no "inherent power" or ancillary jurisdiction over the enforcement
of a settlement agreement absent language in the court's order dismissing the original suit and
specifically retaining jurisdiction over the settiement agreement)).
51. See id. (stating that the Federal Circuit dismissed Dazey's appeal as premature and
suggesting that the district court consider its jurisdiction over the emergency motion in light of
Kokkonen).
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successfully moved the district court to dismiss the declaratory
judgment case Dazey itself had initiated, for lack of jurisdiction.52
National Presto appealed the dismissal to the Federal Circuit.3
The Federal Circuit's opinion in National Presto provides a useful
examination of the underlying principles of federal jurisdiction.
Without any basis to exercise jurisdiction, a federal court cannot issue
a ruling but, rather, must simply announce its lack ofjurisdiction and
move to dismiss the proceeding.54 Neither the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure nor any statute grants federal courts the inherent
authority to interpret and enforce settlement agreements, even when
those agreements pertain to litigation originally pending before
them, without an independent basis to exercise jurisdiction."5
"Standing alone, a settlement agreement is nothing more than a
contract; the imprimatur of an injunction is required to render it a
consent decree enforceable through contempt."
In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America,5 7 the Supreme
Court identified two situations where federal courts may assert
ancillary jurisdiction over a settlement agreement: "(1) to permit
disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and
degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to
function successfully... to manage its proceedings, vindicate its
authority, and effectuate its decrees." 8  The Federal Circuit
concluded in National Presto that neither basis for ancillary
jurisdiction identified by the Supreme Court in Kokkonen was
52. See id. at 1579, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072 (stating that the district court found that
Dazey's emergency motion did not implicate the consent judgment either explicitly or
implicitly, and therefore, the court did not have subject matterjurisdiction).
53. See id. at 1580-82, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073-75 (indicating that National Presto
based its appeal on arguments that district court jurisdiction over emergency motion could be
based either on district court's ancillary jurisdiction or on court's contempt power to address
violations of its orders).
54. See id. at 1580, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (citing The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 247, 250 (1867)); see alsoJohns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 893 F.2d 324, 326 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (recognizing the Supreme Court's indication that neither the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which allow parties by stipulation to dismiss an action, nor any other law gives
federal court jurisdiction over a dispute stemming from the parties' stipulation agreement).
55. See National Presto, 107 F.3d at 1580, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (citing Kokkonen, 511
U.S. at 378).
56. Id. at 1583,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075 (quoting D. Patrick, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 8
F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380-82 (addressing the issue of
whether the district court had inherent power to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement
under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction between insurance agent and insurer in an action
for breach of agency agreement); Lucille v. City of Chicago, 31 F.3d 546, 548-49 (7th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that the court only enforces settlement agreements insofar as their terms are
included in either order orjudgment of court).
57. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
58. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80 (citations omitted).
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available to the district court.9
The Federal Circuit panel recognized that the district court's prior
entry of the consent judgment terminated the parties' federal case
and, with it, any basis for federal jurisdiction over the settlement
agreement that occasioned termination of the action.60 The panel
also found that this was not a case in which the district court was
exercising its contempt powers because the parties' settlement
agreement (the subject of Dazey's declaratory judgment action) was
wholly independent of the consent judgment.61 Indeed, National
Presto did not raise the issue of Dazey's violation of the consent
judgment until more than six months after the district court had
already made its findings.62 The Federal Circuit found that National
Presto's tardy allegation and motion were insufficient to vest the
district court with retroactive jurisdiction to make findings on a case
it had completed more than six months earlier.6 3 The district court
did not retain jurisdiction over the parties' settlement agreement,
nor did it even mention the settlement agreement or its terms, in its
final judgment order.6 As a result of these facts, the court concluded
that ancillary jurisdiction was not available under either of the two
tests set forth in Kokkonen and that the district court had no
jurisdiction to consider Dazey's declaratory judgment action.6
Although the court recognized the essential inequity of allowing
Dazey to obtain a dismissal of a case it initiated only after losing on
59. See National Presto, 107 F.3d at 1582.
60. See id. at 1580-81, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074 (citing Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S.
349, 355 (1996) (finding that after a federal action is dismissed, the claim that may have been
ancillary to the dismissed action cannot be brought subsequent to dismissal of action)).
61. See id. at 1581, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074 (reasoning that letters from National
Presto to Dazey prior to the action mentioned the settlement agreement but not the consent
judgment, and that the emergency motion requested declaratory relief only under the
settlement agreement). The panel recognized that the substance, rather than the titie, of a
party's pleading dictated the matters for adjudication. See id. (citing Andrews v. United States,
373 U.S. 334, 338 (1963)); United States v. Griffin, 782 F.2d 1393, 1399 (7th Cir. 1986).
62. See id. at 1581-82, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074-75 (concluding that neither the parties'
actions nor the prior court proceedings indicated that the consent judgment was an issue
during consideration of Dazey's emergency motion). See id. ("[T]his court (does not] detect in
the parties' behavior or the district court's proceedings any indication that the consent
judgment was at issue anytime during consideration of the emergency motion.").
63. See id. at 1582, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075 (citations omitted) (referring to cases that
state that federal jurisdiction usually is founded on facts existing at the time a complaint is filed,
and that retroactively obtaining jurisdiction-such as arguing federal question as basis for
pendant subject matter jurisdiction after a case has been removed from state court-is
impermissible). Based on the specific findings of the district court that the terms of settlement
agreement and consent judgment were different, the Federal Circuit also rejected National
Presto's argument that non-compliance with the settlement agreement necessarily violated the
consentjudgment. See id.
64. See id. at 1583, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076 (stating that the court failed to reserve
necessaryjurisdiction).
65. See id. at 1582-83,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075-76.
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the merits, the court emphasized thatjurisdictional limitations do not
bend to accommodate individual fairness concerns.66
2. Joinder of parties
In Horphag Research Ltd. v. Consac Industries,67 the Federal Circuit
vacated an order by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, which joined the appellants to a previous order,
and remanded the case back to the district court with instructions."
On June 8, 1993, Horphag Research Ltd. ("Horphag") and M.W.
International, Inc. ("MW") filed suit against Consac Industries
("Consac") for infringement of their registered United States
trademark PYCNOGENOL and infringement of United States Patent
No. 4,698,360 ("the '360 Patent"). 6" When the suit was initiated,
Horphag and Societe Civile D'Investigations Pharmacologiques
D'Aquitaine ("SCIPA") each owned a fifty-percent interest in the '360
Patent.0 Nevertheless, neither petitioner Horphag nor defendant
Consac moved to join SCIPA as a party.
7
1
On October 15, 1993, Consac filed a declaratory judgment action
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
against SCIPA and Societe Civile Pour L'Expansion de la Rechereche
en Phytochimie Appliquee ("SCERPA"), claiming that the '360
Patent was invalid.7 At the time Comsac filed this action, "SCERPA
owned the rights to the registered French trademark
PYCNOGENOLS, but had no interest in the '360 Patent."73
SCERPA transferred its trademark rights in the French trademark
to International Nutrition Company ("INC") on March 7, 1994.74
Concurrently, SCIPA transferred its fifty-percent interest in the '360
Patent to INC. The transfers of the patents from SCERPA and SCIPA
to INC occurred almost ten days after Consac filed a motion to
transfer and consolidate its declaratory judgment action from the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia to the
66. See id. (noting that Congress, and not the federal courts, createsjurisdiction).
67. 116 F.3d 1450,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
68. See id. at 1451-53,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570 (vacating the district court order which
joined International Nutrition Company and Egbert Schwitters as "successor in interest" to the
defendants in a previously close patent and trademark infringement as filed by Horphag
Research Ltd. and M.W. International against Consac Industries, Inc. who had joined INC's
predecessors to the action).








United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.75
On March 24, 1994, Consac's motion to consolidate the actions was
granted.76
On April 8, 1994, SCIPA and SCERPA joined the action against
Horphag, responding to Consac's declaratory judgment complaint,
by arguing that the court lacked personal and subject matter
jurisdiction because SCIPA had assigned its rights in the '360 Patent
to INC." SCIPA and SCERPA also filed a cross-claim against Horphag
and MW, claiming that "Horphag and its agents fraudulently
misappropriated SCERPA's trademark for Horphag's exclusive use
and benefit in the United States in violation of Horphag's agreement
with SCERPA."78
On November 16, 1994, the district court dismissed SCIPA and
SCERPA's cross-claims against Horphag and MW with prejudice,
adding, however, that the dismissal was "without prejudice to the
assertion thereof as counter-claims or cross-claims should Horphag or
MW sue SCIPA or SCERPA in the United States, or elsewhere."7
Horphag and MW later settled their trademark and patent
infringement action against Consac in an agreement stipulating that
all claims and counterclaims were to be dismissed with prejudice.
8
0
On September 9, 1995, INC filed a motion to cancel Horphag's
United States trademark registration for the mark PYCNOGENOL
with the PTO, alleging that it was fraudulently obtained.8' In 1992,
SCIPA, INC's predecessor in interest to the French trademark, filed
an "opposition to Horphag's application to register the mark,"
though the action was subsequently dismissed with prejudice for
failure to prosecute.
On March 14, 1996, Horphag and MW filed a motion to join INC
and Schwitters as parties to the action under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 25 (c) and 71.83 Finding that INC and Schwitters were
the "successors in interest" to SCERPA and SCIPA, the district court
granted the motion."' The court's order expressly "bound INC and





79. Id. at 1452,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568-69.
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claims., 85  The court also ordered INC to withdraw its pending
trademark action in the PTO.ss INC appealed the order to the
Federal Circuit.
87
The Federal Circuit found several problems with the district court's
order. First, it noted that Rule 25(c)ss "only applies to pending
litigation."89  At the time SCIPA and SCERPA transferred the
PYCNOGENOL trademark and '360 Patent to INC, neither was a
party to the patent infringement suit brough by Horphag against
Consac 0  The court further concluded that Consac's separate,
pending declaratory judgment suit against SCIPA and SCERPA in the
District of Columbia district court was "irrelevant" because "[t] he suit
that must be pending is the one in which joinder is sought."9' The
court rejected Horphag's argument that a "parade of horribles"
would result were the court to allow INC to avoid the "court's
jurisdiction" by conveying its interest. The court noted that,
practically speaking, the majority of suits will be filed initially against
the appropriate party, and "any subsequent transfer to avoid the
court's reach [would] trigger Rule 25 (c) ."93
The court also held that Rule 71 was "equally unavailing.9 4
Acknowledging that courts rarely apply Rule 71 to nonparties,
Horphag argued that a court could compel compliance of an order
against the appellants' "bogus and fraudulent[ly] created non-
parties.815 The court noted that it need not reach this issue because
the district court's order was devoid of any findings of fact regarding
the relationship between INC and Schwitters and SCIPA and
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1452-53,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
87. See id.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 25(c) ("In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued
by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the
interest is transferred to be substituted in the action orjoined with the original party.").
89. See Horphag, 116 F.3d at 1453, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569 (citing 3B JEREMY C.
MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 25.08 (2d ed. 1996) ("[S]ubdivision (c) of Rule 25
deals with transfers of interest during the course of the action.")); see also Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chem, Inc., 757 F.2d 1256, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that joinder under
Rule 25(c) is appropriate when transfer transpired before suit was adjudicated); Panther Pumps
& Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 566 F.2d 8, 16 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding that Rule 25(a) applies
only to actions which are pending, not to final judgments completed six years before).




94. See id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 71 ("[W]hen obedience to an order may be lawfully
enforced against a person who is not a party, that person is liable to the same process for
enforcing obedience to the order as if a party.").
95. See Horphag, 116 F.3d at 1453, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569 (relying on Select
Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito America, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 740, 777 (E.D. Wis. 1994) and Land v.
Dollar, 188 F.2d 629, 632, (D.C. Cir. 1951), to support its argument).
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SCERPA.9 The order only noted that INC and Schwitters were
"successors in interest" to SCIPA and SCERPA."7 That evidence,
according to the court, was conclusory and groundless, and
therefore, could not be supported under Rule 71.8
The court further vacated the district court's injunction because
the existing factual evidence provided an inadequate basis upon
which an appellate court could evaluate the injunction." The fact
that the appellants were the successors in interest to the patent and
trademark rights was insufficient to compel the injunction because
their ownership interest to those rights did not, by itself, bind them
to the prior dismissal.1'° Simply because a corporation purchases
another corporation's assets does not mean that it is automatically
bound to the "obligations of its predecessor."'' 1 Though the court
acknowledged that the general rule had exceptions, the record of the
instant case did not suggest that any exceptions applied.'0° In its
holding, the court reiterated the impropriety of joining INC and
Schwitters to a case that was finally adjudicated ten months earlier.' 3
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ADDRESSES SUBSTANTiVE TRADEMARK
ISSUES
A. Likelihood of Confusion Under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act,°
1. Ex parte appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
In In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc.,"0 5 the Federal Circuit affirmed a
Board decision upholding a PTO refusal to register appellant Dixie
Restaurants, Inc.'s ("Dixie") mark, "THE DELTA CAFE & Design"
and design (composed of the words "THE DELTA CAFE" inside a




99. See id. at 1453-4, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569-70 (quoting Weitzman v. Stein, 897 F.2d
653, 658 (2d Cir. 1990) ("An injunction must be vacated if the findings and the record are
insufficient to enable an appellate tribunal to determine the basis for the injunction.")).
100. See id. at 1454,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
101. See id. (citing Panther Pumps & Equipment v. Hydrocraft Inc., 566 F.2d 8, 24 (7th Cir.
1977) ("The well settled rule of American jurisdictions... is that a corporation which
purchases the assets of another corporation does not, by reason of succeeding to the ownership
of property, assume the obligations of the transferor corporation.")).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994).
105. 105 F.3d 1405,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Southern-style cuisine"'' on likelihood of confusion grounds. The
Board upheld the PTO's refusal to register Dixie's mark under
Section 2 (d) of the Lanham Act citing an existing registration for the
mark DELTA covering "hotel, motel, and restaurant services" on
three grounds: (1) the "identical" nature of the parties' services (i.e.,
restaurant services); (2) the similarity between the dominant portion
of Dixie's mark, the term "DELTA", and the cited mark; and (3) the
inability of the remaining weak elements comprising Dixie's mark to
differentiate between the two marks.
07
Dixie challenged the Board's conclusion by arguing that the
examining attorney and the Board improperly discharged their duty
to consider all thirteen likelihood of confusion factors set out in In re
E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.,'08 the precedential model for the PTO,
Board and Federal Circuit.' 9 The court in Dixie, however, noted that
106. Id. at 140506, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532 (citing Application Serial No. 74-353,021).
107. SeeDixie, 105 F.3d at 1405-06,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
108. See id. at 1406-07. 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533-34 (discussing Dixie's argument
regarding the thirteen factors presented in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563,567-68 (C.C.PA. 1973)). Those factors are:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance,
sound, connotation and commercial impression;
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in
an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use;
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of the established, likely-to-continue trade channels;
(4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., "impulse"
vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing,
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use);
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods;
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion;
(8) The length of time during and conditions underwhich there has been concurrent
use without evidence of actual confusion;
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, "family"
mark, product mark);
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark-
(a) a mere "consent" to register or use.
(b) agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion, i.e., limitations on
continued use of the marks by each party.
(c) assignment of mark, application, registration, and good will of the related
business.
(d) laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative of lack
of confusion.
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark
on its goods;
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial;
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567-68.
109. See Opryland USA, Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 850, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that the principal factors in deciding the
likelihood of confusion issue are listed in DuPont); see also 3 McCARTHY, supra note 31, § 23.79
(citing relevant cases).
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it is not clear error for the Board to consider and analyze only the
most relevant and important of the DuPont factors. ' The court even
went so far as to note that "any one of the factors may control a
particular case."'
The court has often noted that, depending on the facts of a
particular case, certain DuPont factors should play a greater role than
others in the likelihood of confusion analysis." By stating that any
one factor may control a case, however, the court may well have taken
this well-settled principle one step too far. This language could be
construed to suggest that a likelihood of confusion may be
determined based upon only one DuPont factor. Likelihood of
confusion must be considered by examining at least two factors. For
instance, confusion cannot be considered likely based only upon the
similarity of the two marks at issue (DuPont factor No. 1). n1 Rather,
the similarity of the goods or services at issue (DuPont factor No. 2),
or the fame of the prior mark (DuPont factor No. 5) must also play a
part in any reasoned evaluation." This approach even applies to
famous and well-known marks. For example, if a company were to
use the notoriously famous NIKE mark, a court could not determine
the likelihood of confusion without knowing, at minimum, what
goods or services are identified by the second user. Use of the mark
for complex and expensive surgical devices might render confusion
unlikely. Permitting the PTO, Board, and Federal Circuit to
determine the likelihood of confusion based only on one DuPont
factor would be akin to granting a dilution-like cause of action, a
110. See Dixie, 105 F.3d at 1406-07, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533-34; cf. Koster v. United
States, 685 F.2d 407, 414, 231 Ct. CI. 301, 311 (1982) (holding that a Board decision does not
have to discuss all claims made).
111. Dixie, 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361-
62, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567 ("[T]he evidentiary elements are not listed above in order of
merit... [e]ach may from case to case play a dominant role.")).
112. See Opryland, 970 F.2d at 850, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473 ("Not all of the DuPont
factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case."); Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enters., Inc.,
951 F.2d 330, 333, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that one DuPont
factor may outweigh the others); Nina Ricci, SAR.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., Inc., 889 F.2d 1070,
1073, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901, 1902 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[D]ifferent elements may play the
dominant role in different cases.");Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp., 853 F.2d
888, 893, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1628, 1632 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[T]hat question is resolved by
considering a variety of factors, each of which may play a more dominant role depending upon
the particular circumstances of the respective users."); In re Mastic Inc., 829 F.2d 1114, 1117, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he factors themselves ... must be weighed
in the likelihood of confusion determination .... ").
113. See In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (Cust. CL 1973), 177
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.PA. 1973) (clarifying that confusion is relevant to application in
the marketplace, the effect not to the nature of the mark).
114. See id. 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567.
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remedy currently reserved for the district courts."'
Indeed, the court in DuPont did not envision such a sweeping
holding."' 6 The Dixie court relied on language from DuPont holding
that "each [element] may from case to case play a dominant role.
'' 7
The DuPont court based this proposition on cases in which one factor,
in combination with another factor, was used to determine the
likelihood of confusion."'
On the merits, the court in Dixie affirmed the Board's holding that
the mark, "THE DELTA CAFE & Design," resembled the previously
registered DELTA mark in appearance, sound, and meaning."9 The
court specifically noted that the dominant portion of Dixie's mark-
"Delta"-may be given more weight because "Cafe" is a generic term
for restaurant services and was appropriately disclaimed in Dixie's
application.'20 In addition, the court in Dixie held that, "[n] either the
design element nor the generic term 'cafe' offers sufficient
distinctiveness [to Dixie's mark] to create a different commercial
impression [from the word mark DELTA] ..... The court reasoned
further that the identity of the dominant portion of a mark is
particularly significant in the restaurant industry where restaurants
are often recommended by word of mouth.ss
115. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 11995) (providing a cause of action to the opposition
when the registration of the mark by applicant dilutes the opposition's marks); see also Babson
Bros. Co. v. Surge Power Corp., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953, 1954-55 (T.T.A.B. 1996) (holding
that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(1), does not provide a
statutory ground for opposition or cancellation proceeding before the PTO or Board, but
rather creates a federal cause of action in the district courts).
116. See DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1362, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567 ("In every case turning on
likelihood of confusion, it is the duty of the examiner, the board and this court to find, upon
consideration of all the evidence, whether or not confusion appears likely.").
117. See In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531, 1533
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 568).
118. See DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567 (citing Schenley Distillers,
Inc. v. General Cigar Co., Inc., 427 F.2d 783, 785, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 142, 143 (C.C.PA. 1970)
(finding that the variety of goods on which a mark is used [factor nine] combined with the
dissimilarity of the nature of the goods [factor two] makes confusion unlikely)); McKesson &
Robbins, Inc. v. P. Lorillard Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306, 308 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (finding that
factor nine pointed to the conclusion that confusion was unlikely when considering factor two,
i.e., same mark was placed on beverages and tobacco); cf John Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. Tampa
Cigar Co., Inc., 124 F. Supp. 254, 256, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 21, 22 (S.D. Fla. 1954), af'd, 222
F.2d 460, 461, 105 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 351, 351 (5th Cir. 1955) (finding that factor five made
confusion likely when considered with factor two, i.e., same mark was placed on beverages and
tobacco).
119. See Dixie, 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533 (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567 (factor one)).
120. See id
121. Id. at 1407,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533-34.
122. See id. at 1407,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534 (quoting Giant Food, Inc. v. Nations Food
Service, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); supra Part
IA3 (providing a thorough discussion of the court's analysis on this argument).
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In In re Darren Rittenhouse," the court affirmed a Board decision
upholding a PTO refusal to register appellant Darren Rittenhouse's
("Rittenhouse") stylized "O's" mark for "clothing, including T-shirts,
hats, caps, jackets, and sweatshirts"'24  on grounds of confusing
similarity with six registered marks for identical or nearly identical
goods owned by the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership.25
On appeal, Rittenhouse challenged both the Board's likelihood of
confusion finding as well as the underlying validity of the cited
registrations.121 Rittenhouse contended that confusion between his
"O's" mark and the cited registrant's was unlikely because his mark
123. 124 F.3d 228, No. 97-1252, 1997 WL 556298, (Fed. Cir. Sept. 9, 1997) (unpublished
table decision).
124. Id. at 1; see also In re Darren Rittenhouse, No. 74-287,220, 1997 WL 556298 (T.T.A.B.
Oct. 2, 1996).
125. See Rittenhouse, 1997 WL 556298, at * 1. In its decision the court focuses on two of those
registrations. They are Nos.: 1,831,753 for the mark "ORIOLES BALTIMORE" and design
(employing the stylized "0" at issue in this case) covering: metal novelty items; namely, key
tags, key chains, trophies of non-precious metal, and money clips (in International Class 6);
watches, clocks, souvenir coins, and jewelry; namely, wall clocks and wristwatches, non-monetary
coins and medallions, cloisonnE pins, lapel pins, pins, pendants and charms (in International
Class 14); paper goods and printed matter, namely, bumper stickers, laminated signs, decals,
paper weights, metal bulletin boards, pens, pencils, pads, letter openers, posters, note paper,
baseball cards; programs, magazines, books, and booklets relating to baseball; calendars,
erasers, pencil sharpeners, drafting and drawing rulers, coloring books, playing cards, folders
and postcards (in International Class 16); luggage; namely, athletic bags, attach6 cases, baby
back packs, duffel bags, tote bags, billfolds, briefcases, canes; business, credit and passport card
cases; knapsacks, and leashes, passport cases, briefcase-type portfolios, purses, rucksacks,
umbrellas (in International Class 18); beverage containers; namely, mugs, water bottles, serving
trays not of precious metal, trash cans, aluminum tankards, foam can holders, ceramic mugs,
ceramic tankards, glass tankards, drinking glasses, bottle openers, bowls, ice buckets,
toothbrushes and lunch boxes (in International Class 21); clothing; namely, shirts, shorts,
diapers, dresses, jogging suits, socks, underwear, jackets, sweaters, vests, pants, ponchos, visors,
raincoats, hats, caps, cloth bibs, two-piece, baby pants, baby booties and short sets, ties, men's
and women's formal wear, pajamas, sweatshirts, mittens, gloves, knitted headwear, scarves,
hosiery, wristbands, headbands, robes, aprons, and shoes (in International Class 25); toys and
sporting goods; namely, stuffed animals, balloons, baseballs, playground balls, toy banks;
baseball equipment; namely, bases, bats, bat grips, batting gloves, batting tees, gloves and mitts;
bean bags, billiard game playing equipment, checker and chess sets, video game cartridges,
chest protectors, Christmas tree ornaments, dolls and doll accessories, hand-held electronic
games, and rods, flotation devices for recreational use; golf equipment; namely, putters and
golf balls; noisemakers, coin and non-coin operated, decorative wind socks, autographed
baseballs and inflatable bats (in International Class 28); and entertainment services in the
nature of baseball exhibitions (in International Class 41). See Trademark Registration No.
1,831,753, available in LEXIS, Trdmrk Library, Fedtm File. They also focused on Registration
No. 1,605,473 for the mark "ORIOLES" (also employing the stylized "0" at issue in this case)
covering "trading cards, stickers, posters, decals, labels, score cards, programs, scorebooks,
yearbooks and postcards (in International Class 16); cloth pennants (in International Class 24);
clothing-namely, T-shirts, sweatshirts, jackets, sweaters, sun visors, hats and caps (in
International Class 25). SeeTrademark Registration No. 1,605,473, available in LEXIS, Trdmrk
Library, Fedtm File.
126. See Rittenhouse, 1997 WL 556298, at *1; see also supra Part IA.3 (providing a thorough
discussion of the court's analysis on the appellant's challenge to the validity of the cited
registrations).
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had a "different appearance and connotation.'' 7  In addition,
Rittenhouse claimed that the registration of another "O's" mark for
T-shirts conflicted with the Board's refusal to register his mark.
2
1
Reviewing the case de novo, the court found that the stylization of
Rittenhouse's mark was "remarkably similar" to the cited marks
because "[bloth include an oblong capitalized '0' that is tilted to the
right, an arched line through the top of the '0,' and a script 's,'
which has a flared 'tail' that underscores the 'O'."'2 These
similarities did not exist in the third-party registration relied upon by
Rittenhouse.' Based upon these striking similarities, the court
agreed with the Board and the PTO that consumers were likely to
associate Rittenhouse's goods with the Baltimore Orioles Baseball
Club.'5 ' The court limited its focus to only those few DuPont
likelihood of confusion factors of record.12  As in In re Dixie
Restaurants, Inc., the court boldly asserted that "any one factor may
control a particular case.'133
In In re Diamond Pacific Tool Corp.,'s4 the Federal Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part a Board decision affirming a PTO refusal to
register three applications for the mark "DIAMOND PACIFIC"'35 and
127. Id.
128. See id. That mark is the now canceled Registration No. 1,229,247 for the mark
"O's" and design covering: keychains and metal badges (in International Class 6);
pendants and chains with pendants (in International Class 14); baseball cards, printed
baseball game schedules and writing pens (in International Class 16); traveling bags and
tote bags (in International Class 18); seat cushions and novelty items comprising a plastic
representation of a person's hand spring mounted on a platform for movement simulative
of waving of the hand (in International Class 20); mugs and cups (in International Class
21); T-shirts, jackets, ponchos, wrist sweatbands and jogging shorts (in International Class
25); baseball equipment carrying bags, baseball batting gloves and flying disc toys (in
International Class 28); ashtrays (in International Class 34); entertainment services namely,
the playing of baseball games (in International Class 41). See Trademark Registration No.
1,229,247 available in LEXIS, Trdmrk Library, Fedtm File.
129. Id. at*2.
130. See id.
131. See id. Because the court upheld the Board's section 2(d) refusal, it concluded that it
did not need to address the Board's alternate refusal under section 2(a) that Rittenhouse's
mark falsely suggests a connection with institutions, namely the Baltimore Orioles. See id. at *1
n.1; see also Popular Merchandising Co. v. "21" Club, Inc., 343 F.2d 1011, 1015, 145 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 203, 206-07 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (holding that section 2(a) encompasses false suggestions
with commercial corporations).
132. See In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563,
567 (C.C.PA. 1973) (listing the factors considered in analyzing the likelihood of confusion).
133. Rittenhouse, 1997 WL 556298, at *1; see also supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text
(discussing In reDixie Restaurant, Inc. factors and the court's statement that any one factor may
be controlling).
134. 113 F.3d 1257, No. 96-1347, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10722 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 1997)
(unpublished table decision).
135. See Diamond Pac., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10722, at *2-4. Those applications are: No. 74-
356,178 for the mark "DIAMOND PACIFIC" for "abrasive compositions, namely, jewelers'
rouge, consisting of iron oxide, aluminum oxide, or silicon dioxide ... power operated
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requiring the applicant to disclaim the DIAMOND portion of the
mark in two of the applications.
The court refused registration for the mark "DIAMOND PACIFIC"
for "hand tools, namely, pliers" on the ground it would be likely to
cause confusion with six registrations for the word mark "DIAMOND"
and stylized and design forms of that mark for pliers and other hand
tools.'6 On appeal, the applicant argued that the PTO examining
attorney and the Board improperly focused on the DIAMOND
portion of both marks and ignored the important PACIFIC element
of its mark.' 7 The court disagreed, noting that it was not error to
emphasize this dominant portion of the mark.38 Moreover, the PTO
and Board correctly gave greater weight to the word portion of the
cited marks because "it is by the words that purchasers will refer to
the goods, and the words, rather than the design feature or the
stylized lettering, will have a greater impression on them."'' 9
Furthermore, confusion was likely because the registrations identified
goods identical to those covered by the applicant's mark, and because
that mark incorporated the entire word portion of the cited marks.'
40
The court also examined the requirement that the applicant
disclaim the "DIAMOND" portion of the composite "DIAMOND
PACIFIC" mark in its application for "lapidary machines.' 4' The
court maintained the requirement, reasoning that "lapidary machines
can employ diamond abrasive wheels to cut and polish precious
diamond abrasive wheels for grinding and polishing... said wheels being sold by applicant only
at retail and to independent dealers to consumers in the lapidary industry and hobbyists of gem
stones"; No. 74-355,895 for the mark "DIAMOND PACIFIC" for "motor driven lapidary
machines capable of cutting and polishing only hand-held gems;" other than diamonds and
only in a cabochon or rounded shape; and No. 74-355,798 for the mark "DIAMOND PACIFIC"
for "hand tools, namely, pliers." See id.
136. See id. at *2. Those registrations are: No. 1,204,314 for the mark DIAMOND & Design
for wrenches; pliers; nippers; staple pullers; snips; crate and box openers; farriers tools, namely,
hoof rasps, hoof pads; punches; chisels; hammers; screw and nut drivers; measuring tapes; No.
689,064 for the mark DIAMOND & Design for wrenches, pliers, nippers, staple pullers, metal
cutting snips, crate and box openers, machine and hand thread-forming taps, crowbars, and
hooks; No. 625,272 for the mark DIAMOND (Stylized) for adjustable wrenches; No. 401,457 for
the mark DIAMOND & Design for single end adjustable wrenches, double end adjustable
wrenches, wrench parts, counter advertising boards displaying wrenches, thin straight nosed
pliers, thin bent nosed pliers, motor special pliers, D. C. combination slipjoint pliers, crate
openers, horseshoe calk extractors, both single and double ended; calk punches, machine and
hand threaded-forming taps; No. 209,074 for the mark DIAMOND & Design for wrenches; No.
668,644 for the mark DIAMOND for all types of pliers, wrenches, nippers, tin snips, railroad
picks, box openers, clevis hooks, chain hooks, crow-bars and mattocks. See id.
137. See id. at *6.
138. See id. at *7.
139. Id.
140. See id
141. See id. at*8.
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stones.' '4 2  As a characteristic of a substantial component of
applicant's goods, "diamond abrasive wheels" are considered a
characteristic of the whole machine and, in that context, the term
DIAMOND is descriptive because "people in the industry would
believe that 'DIAMOND' for lapidary machines refers to a lapidary
machine that uses diamond abrasive wheels.' 4 In addition, the court
held that the Board did not clearly err in its disclaimer requirement
because "[i]f Applicant's lapidary machines are capable of cutting
and polishing diamonds, then the mark is merely descriptive."'" On
the other hand, if Applicant's machines are not capable of cutting
and polishing diamonds, then the mark is deceptively misdescriptive.
In either circumstance, the 'DIAMOND' portion must be
disclaimed.',
45
The court found that the PTO and Board did not clearly err in
holding that the application to use the mark, "DIAMOND PACIFIC,"
for lapidary machines could be confused with a prior registration for
"PACIFIC GRINDING WHEELS SINCE 1898 & Design."' 46 The court
reasoned that the "DIAMOND" portion of applicant's mark was
descriptive and should accordingly be given less weight than the
"PACIFIC" portion of the mark. 47 Further, the court noted that
because the goods identified in the cited registrations cover abrasive
grinding wheels-the "principal component in lapidary machines"-
they were properly characterized as "related" goods.4
The court next addressed (1) the decision to refuse the
registration of the mark "DIAMOND PACIFIC" for 'jewelers' rouge"
and "operated diamond abrasive wheels" based upon the cited
registrations, and (2) the requirement that the "DIAMOND" portion
of the mark be disclaimed for both of those goods.
49
With regard to the disclaimer requirement for 'Jewelers' rouge,"
the court parted with the Board and reversed the requirement. The
court found unpersuasive the Board's holding that DIAMOND is
descriptive because "[a] rouge is used to polish gems, diamonds are




146. See id. at *13. That mark is Registration No. 620,608 for "abrasive materials-namely,
abrasive grinding wheels, reinforced grinding wheels, bonded abrasive products, hones, jointer
stones, dressing and rubbing bricks, abrasive sticks, segment wheel chucks, and abrasive filter
plates." See Trademark Registration No. 620,608, available in LEXIS, Trdmrk Library, Fedtm
File.
147. SeeDiamond Pac., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10722, at *12-13.
148. Id.at*13.
149. See id. at *14-15.
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gems, thus applicant's Jewelers' rouge could 'conceivably' polish
diamonds, and therefore 'DIAMOND' must be descriptive of
Jewelers' rouge."'56 The court believed that this syllogism fell short of
the PTO's evidentiary burden of making a prima facie showing that
the mark is merely descriptive.'5 ' According to the court, simply
because a good could "conceivably" perform a function is insufficient
to meet the PTO's burden. Furthermore, any doubt about the
descriptive quality of a mark should be resolved in the applicant's
favor.15
The court, however, found that the Board did not err in holding
that the "DIAMOND" portion of the "DIAMOND PACIFIC" mark is
merely descriptive of "power operated diamond abrasive wheels."
The court reasoned that "[t]he fact that the identified goods are
diamond abrasive wheels speaks for itself.'
5 3
Lastly, the court agreed with the Board that power-operated
diamond abrasive wheels for grinding and polishing are legally
identical to the goods identified in the cited registrations thereby
rendering confusion likely.154 The applicant argued that the PTO's
refusal of the entire application was inappropriate because the
examining attorney failed to stipulate which classes of goods formed
the basis for rejecting the 'Jeweler's rouge" portion of the application
in the final action. 5 At oral argument, the Commissioner conceded
that the mark "DIAMOND PACIFIC" for jewelers' rouge was not
barred by section 2(d). Accordingly, the court held that the
applicant could overcome the refusal to register the application by
removing the Class 7 goods from the application. 6
2. Inter partes appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
In one of the few cases to reverse a Board decision, the court held
in TBC Corp. v. Holsa, Inc. 57 that the Board's dismissal of an
opposition was erroneous in view of the similarities between the
applicant's "GRAND SLAM" mark for motor vehicle tires and the
150. Id. at*14.
151. See id.
152. See id. (citing In reMerrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1571, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("It is incumbent on the board to balance the
evidence of public understanding of the mark against the degree of descriptiveness
encumbering the mark, and to resolve reasonable doubt in favor of the applicant, in
accordance with practice and precedent.")).
153. Id. at *15.
154. Seeid. at*16.
155. See id. at * 15.
156. See id. at *16.
157. 126 F.3d 1470,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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previously used mark "GRAND AM" for tires.' s8
The court agreed with the Board that the applicant's "GRAND
SLAM" mark covered goods "which are identical or otherwise closely
related to those marketed and distributed by opposer" and that
"[t]he ultimate purchasers of these goods constitute a broad range of
individuals from very knowledgeable car enthusiasts to persons who
have little or no knowledge of tires."'59 The court was unpersuaded
by the applicant's reliance on a substantial number of third-party
registrations to prove that consumers are familiar with the cited
marks and therefore accustomed to the existence of similar marks in
the marketplace.160
The court, however, disagreed with the Board's conclusion that
confusion was unlikely between "GRAND SLAM" and "GRAND AM"
for tires.16' First, the court disagreed with the Board's finding that
"GRAND SLAM" imparted a "distinct connotation" because it has
recognized meanings in bridge, baseball, golf, and tennis.'62 Despite
"grand slam's" well-defined meaning in those areas, the court found
it had no such meaning for automobile tires, and accordingly, found
that the term was neither descriptive nor suggestive of tires or any of
their properties. According to the Court's analysis, because many
tire buyers will not be familiar with those definitions, they will have
no effect when they see the word on tires.164
The court took particular issue with the Board's failure to deal
specifically with the similarities between opposer's mark "GRAND
AM" and applicant's mark "GRAND SLAM."'6 Discounting the
Board's emphasis on the weakness of the term "GRAND," the court
noted that "[i]t does not matter that 'GRAND' is 'laudatory,' a
characteristic the Board thought contributed to its 'weakness' as a
trademark."'' 6 Rather, because the marks share the term "GRAND"
"[i] t is a major contributor to overall similarity.' '6 7 Because the marks
158. See id., 1470-71, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317 (discussing Application Serial No. 74-
051,660).
159. Id. at 1471, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316 (quoting TBC Corp. v. Holsa, Inc.,
Opposition No. 84,567, Slip Op. at 10 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 29, 1995) (stating the conclusions with
which the court agrees despite its ultimate reversal of the Board's decision)).
160. See id. (agreeing with the Board that third-party registrations do not prove that
consumers familiar with a particular mark would also be accustomed to similar marks in the
marketplace).
161. See id. at 1471, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1471, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
164. See id. at 1472, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
165. See id. at 1471, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
166. Id. at 1472,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
167. Id.
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will be marketed over the telephone and on television, the similarity
in sound between "GRAND SLAM" and "GRAND AM" would likely
result in confusion.'8 The court reiterated the well-settled principle
that "notwithstanding the fact that each syllable of each mark
generates its own impact, the only impact to be considered is that of
the marks as a whole; they are not to be dissected in considering
likelihood of confusion or mistake."'6
Finally, the court invoked the long-established rule that doubts
about whether a likelihood of confusion exists must be resolved
against a "newcomer"r-in this case the applicant who filed an intent-
to-use application"
In Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Steven Maxfield,"' the court affirmed a Board
decision dismissing an opposition to the mark "MIGHTY MAX" for
"custom built trucks, repair services, conversions, customizing and
rebuilding of new and used trucks, and retail truck parts and
accessory store services,"' 2 based upon opposer's marks "MACK",
"MAXIDYNE", "MAXITORQUE", "MAXI-MISER", "MAXI-BILT",
"MAXI-GLAS", "DYNAMAX", "REDIMAX", "CENTRI-MAX", "AERO-
MAX", and "QUICK-MAX", all for trucks, truck parts, and related
goods.'7
In reviewing the Board's decision de novo, the court agreed that:
"(1) the goods and services of the parties are legally identical; (2) the
MACK mark is a famous mark; (3) MIGHTY MAX and MACK
considered in their entireties, are distinguishable in sound,
appearance, and connotation; and (4) no evidence of actual
confusion between MIGHTY MAX and MACK exists, despite the fact
that the marks have been contemporaneously used in the same
geographic area for at least ten years. " '74
The court further noted that, even considering the identity of the
goods and services involved, and the undisputed fame of the
opposer's "MACK" mark, neither fact, alone or in combination,
168. See id.
169. Id. at 1473, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (describing the principle originally
established in San Fernando Electric Mfg. Co. v.JFD Electronics Components Corp., 565 F.2d
683, 685, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 3 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
170. See id. (applying the "newcomer rule" established in San Fernando, 565 F.2d at 684, 196
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1 that dismissed an opposition to "MICROCERAM" mark based on the prior
registration of "MONOCERAM," applied to identical goods).
171. 106 F.3d 426, No. 96-1208, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 492 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 1997)
(unpublished table decision).
172. See Trademark Registration No. 3117, 142 available in LEXIS, Trdmrk Library, Fedtm
File.
173. See Mack Trucks, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 492, at *1.
174. Id. at*2.
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compelled a finding of likelihood of confusion.' 7*5 Rather, the
addition of "MIGHTY' to "MAX" further separated the already-
distinguishable "MAX" and "MACK" marks in sound, appearance,
and connotation.Y The court also emphasized that the record
contained no evidence of actual confusion, despite the
contemporaneous use of the marks for the same goods and services
in the same geographic area for ten years.177
This holding is significant in view of the court's strong language in
Dixie78 and Rittenhous 79 that any "one" DuPont factor may "control"
the likelihood of confusion analysis. Here, the court correctly
recognized the need to look at the interplay between several factors
notwithstanding the strength of the senior user's mark-implicitly
acknowledging that the PTO and Board cannot grant a dilution-like
remedy. Lastly, the court agreed that the opposer's other "MAX"-
formative marks were equally distinguishable from the applicant's
"MIGHTY MAX" marks.80
In the unpublished decision Mezzacorona S.C.A.RL. v. Tortes, S.A., 8'
the court affirmed a Board decision granting an opposition against
the mark "MEZZACORONA" for "wines and sparkling wines '182 based
upon prior registrations for the marks "CORONAS" and "GRAN
CORONAS," both for "wines."83 Reviewing the issue of likelihood of
confusion de novo, the court found that the Board's consideration of
only three of the thirteen DuPont factors was not reversible error
because they were the only factors "of record" before the Board."
Those factors were: (1) the similarity of the goods in the application
and registrations; (2) the similarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels; and (3) the similarity of the marks in their entireties
as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.'
The court found the Board's conclusion that the products were the
same was not clear error because all three marks involved in the
175. See id. at *2-3 (citing University of Notre Dame Du Lac v.J.C. Gourmet Food Imports
Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 1372, 1374, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 505, 507 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that a
famous name is insufficient to establish likelihood of confusion and that there must be a
reasonable basis for the public to connect the product or service to another's famous mark)).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531, 1533
(Fed. Cir. 1997)
179. In re Rittenhouse, 1997 WL 556298, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 9, 1997).
180. See Mack Trucks, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 492, at *4.
181. No. 97-1339, 1997WL 786911 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
182. See id. at *1 (discussing Application Serial No. 74-301,039).






opposition were used on European wines stocked and displayed in
the same areas of American stores.'' The court also approved the
Board's finding that those products traveled in the same channels of
trade and were sold to the same class of purchasers. In view of the
identity of the goods the marks identified, the amount of proof
necessary to demonstrate that the marks were likely to be confused
would necessarily be lower."
The court also upheld the Board's factual finding that the marks
were similar in physical appearance, pronunciation, and
connotation.'9 The court agreed that the marks were sufficiently
similar because all three shared the same dominant term,
"CORONA."'" Although the Board may not dissect competing marks
to determine confusing similarity, it may compare the dominant
elements of the marks."" When considering the overall similarities of
two competing marks, descriptive or generic portions of a mark
should be afforded less weight or significance.192 Here, the Board
properly accorded less weight to the terms "MEZZA" and "GRAN,"
both of which mean "large" and are, thus, descriptive of size and
entitled to little independent significance." The court further
agreed that because the marks can be interpreted as referring to a
crown, all three impart the same overall commercial impression.
Lastly, the court noted that to determine likelihood of confusion
accurately, competing marks must be considered in their commercial
context.9 4 Although the Board did not consider the marks as they
would appear in the marketplace, the court believed that doing so
would nevertheless yield the same result, making the Board's failure
harmless legal error.
186. See id. at *2.
187. See id.
188. See id. (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877,
23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) to reach the conclusion that the quantum of
proof necessary to demonstrate the likelihood of confusion is lower when goods are legally
identical).
189. See id. at *2.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. (citing In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058-59, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("That a particular feature is descriptive or generic with respect to the
involved goods or services is one commonly accepted rationale for giving less weight to a
portion of a mark....")).
193. See id
194. See id. (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1569, 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 390, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (ruling that the likelihood of confusion of the marks
must be evaluated in the context of the marketplace because that is where confusion may
occur)).
195. See id. at *2-3.
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In Ronda AG v. Harley-Davidson, Inc.,"' the court affirmed a Board
decision granting summary judgment to the cancellation petitioner
Harley-Davidson, Inc. based on likelihood of confusion between its
registered marks "HARLEY-DAVIDSON" and "HARLEY," for, inter
alia, jewelry, watches, clothing, and motorcycles; and Ronda's
HARLEY mark in stylized letters, registered on the Supplemental
Register for "mechanical and quartz watches, mechanical and quartz
movements, and watch parts."1 97 The court also affirmed the Board's
holding that Ronda failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact in
its laches defense.9 On appeal, Ronda challenged the Board's entry
of summary judgment for Harley-Davidson on the priority, likelihood
of confusion, and laches issues.9
The court resolved the priority issue by noting that Harley-
Davidson used the HARLEY-DAVIDSON mark on jewelry and
clothing for a substantial period of time before Ronda .2 1 On the
likelihood of confusion issue, the court agreed that confusion was
likely between the marks because: (1) HARLEY-DAVIDSON is a well-
known and famous trademark; (2) the term HARLEY is the dominant
portion of the mark HARLEY-DAVIDSON, as evidenced by third-
party use as well as Harley-Davidson's own advertising; and (3)
watches and jewelry are related goods.Y9' Although Ronda
emphasized that no evidence of actual confusion was introduced
before the Board, actual confusion is only one factor in establishing
likelihood of confusion, the absence of which is not determinative.2
On the issue of laches, the court noted that Ronda must show that
(1) Harley-Davidson unduly delayed asserting rights against Ronda,
and (2) Ronda suffered prejudice resulting from Harley-Davidson's
delay.23 Ronda argued that the Board erroneously placed the burden
of proving laches on Ronda, rather than on the summary judgment
movant, Harley-Davidson. 4  Because the Board's decision did not
identify which party should carry the burden, the court reviewed this
196. 108 F.3d 1393, No. 96-1297, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3597 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 1997)
(unpublished table decision).
197. Id. at *2 (discussing terms of Serial No. 73-319,201 in the Supplemental Register).
198. See id. at *1.
199. See id. at *2.
200. See id. at *3 (noting that Ronda first used the mark in August 1979).
201. See id. at *3-4.
202. See id. at *4 (finding that the confusion issue was another factor to be considered).
203. See id. (citing National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. American Cinema Editors, Inc.,
937 F.2d 1572, 1580, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1424, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that defense of
laches requires showing of undue delay in asserting rights and prejudice resulting from such
delay)).
204. See id. at *4-5.
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issue de novo.2°5 The court agreed with the Board's holding, finding
that even if the Board erroneously imposed the burden on Ronda, it
was a harmless error.20
To show that it was prejudiced by Harley-Davidson's delay, Ronda
submitted a declaration from its general manager stating that:
(1) Ronda used the HARLEY mark since 1980 on watch parts,
movements, and watches; (2) Ronda last used the HARLEY mark in
1989 and intended to resume use of the mark; (3) Ronda invests in
advertising and promotions of the HARLEY brand in the United
States every year; and (4) the HARLEY brand is an important and
valuable asset to Ronda, responsible for millions of dollars of its sales,
the loss of which would greatly damage Ronda's business.2 7 The
court found that this evidence alone failed to create the genuine
issue of material fact necessary to defeat Harley-Davidson's summary
judgment motion.
To defeat the motion, the court noted that Ronda needed to
establish the existence of an element essential to its case, one as to
which it would bear the burden of proof at trial.2" Because Ronda
would ultimately bear the burden of proof on its laches affirmative
defense, it needed to point to specific facts demonstrating a genuine
issue to be resolved at trial.210 Here, the court found that Ronda's
211mere denials and conclusory statements failed to meet this burden.
The court acknowledged its previous holding that "long
acquiescence in the use of a trademark by a successful business, even
without expansion of trade, may provide a basis for a valid inference
of prejudice."2  In order to invoke the laches defense successfully,
however, a nonexpanding business must be successful, use a
trademark for a substantial period of time, and continue to nurture
the mark through advertising during that time.2 3 The court found
that Ronda's business growth over four-and-a-half years was not, by
205. See id. at *5.
206. See id.
207. See id. at *5-6 (arguing that the value of the mark to the company increased each year).
208. See id. at *6.
209. See id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (stating that Rule
56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the party opposing summary judgment to
respond only if the moving party has met its initial burden)).
210. Secid.
211. See id. (citing Barmag Barmer MaschinenfabrikAGv. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831,
836, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 564 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that a party opposing a motion
must show an on the record evidentiary conflict and that mere denials are insufficient)).
212. Id. at *8 (quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Midwest Cordage Co., 373 F.2d 1015, 1019, 153
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 73,76 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).
213. See id. at *8-9.
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214itself, sufficient to demonstrate prejudice per se. The court advised
that Ronda's declaration might be sufficient if it presented specific
evidence of "increased sales, promotional expenditures, or
substantial growth in trade."
215
Because Ronda failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on
the prejudice element of its laches defense, the court did not address
Harley-Davidson's argument that laches can only be asserted
successfully in cancellation proceedings if reasonable doubt exists on
211,the ultimate issue of likelihood of confusion. Similarly, the court
also noted that it need not decide whether Ronda's four-and-a-half-
year delay constituted "undue delay.
21 7
3. An Appeal from Federal District Court
In OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 218 the court affirmed a
district court decision granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant Just Toys on plaintiff OddzOn's claims of design patent
infringement, trade dress infringement, and state law unfair
competition.1 9
OddzOn, a toy and sporting goods company and maker of the
popular 'Vortex" ball,220 sued Just Toys, another toy and sporting
goods company, for its sale of "Ultra Pass Balls" for design patent
infringement, trade dress infringement, and state law unfair
competition.2' The "Vortex" ball and "Ultra Pass Balls" were both
foam football-shaped balls with a tail and fin.
The court upheld the district court's holding that OddzOn had a
valid design patent for its ball and Just Toys did not infringe
214. See id.
215. Id. at *9 (citing Ralston Purina, 373 F.2d at 1019, 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 76 (finding
.no laches where evidence of promotional expenditure was not submitted and sales dated did
not show any substantial growth of trade during the period of issue")). See A.C. Aukerman Co.
v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1033, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (en banc) ("The courts must look for a change in the economic position of the alleged
infringer during the period of delay.").
216. See Rhonda AG, No. 96-1297, 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 3597, at *10 n.1 (Ultra-White Co. v.
Johnson Chem. Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 891, 893, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 166, 167 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
(holding that "evidence of laches may be considered only in cases where likelihood of
confusion is reasonably in doubt"); Swank, Inc. v. Ravel Perfume Corp., 438 F.2d 622, 624, 168
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 723, 725 (C.C.P.A. 1971) ("Where the competing marks are identical or are
closely similar, the equitable principles defined by section 19 have been held not to be
applicable insomuch as the public interest is the dominant consideration.")).
217. See Rhonda AG, No. 96-1297, 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 3597, at *10 n.1 (leaving open the
question of what is required to demonstrate undue delay).
218. 122 F.3d 1396, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
219. See OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1399, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
220. See id. (describing Vortex ball patent design).
221. See id. at 1399-1400,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
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OddzOn's patent.2 Despite their similar appearance, the evidence
introduced on summary judgment was insufficient to prove design
patent infringement and to show that this similarity was attributable
to the ball's ornamental, nonfunctional features rather than its
general overall appearance.22'
Concerning its trade dress claims, OddzOn argued on appeal that
the district court erroneously granted Just Toys's motion for summary
judgment because OddzOn was not given an opportunity to address
224the likelihood of confusion issue. The court disagreed, finding that
OddzOn responded with a design patent survey, samples of
alternative ball designs, and a trade dress likelihood of confusion
survey and that OddzOn never suggested that it possessed any other
trade dress surveys regarding likelihood of confusion.2
OddzOn also argued that the "District Court improperly
discounted the evidence of record, including its trade dress
consumer survey[,]" in finding that OddzOn failed to establish a
likelihood of confusion under the Ninth Circuit's eight-factor test.
226
The court agreed with the lower court that confusion was not likely
because "the defendant's balls are clearly and prominently labeled,
the crowded toy market leads to a conclusion that consumers have
experience selecting between two marks with care, and the time
consumers will spend comparing the balls makes it unlikely that




The court also found that the district court properly discounted
OddzOn's trade dress survey to the extent it showed that consumers
222. See id. at 1401-04,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644-49.
223. See id. at 1405-06, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. The court also ruled on the unsettled
issue of whether the matter encompassed by section 102(f) of the Patent Act, which prohibits
one from obtaining a patent on an invention one invented oneself, constitutes "prior art" under
section 103. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(f), 103 (1994). The court held that "subject matter derived
from another not only is itself unpatentable to the party who derived it under § 102(f), but,
when combined with other prior art, may make a resulting obvious invention unpatentable to
that party under a combination of §§ 102(f) and 103." OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1403,43 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1646. In light of the ambiguous nature of the statute, however, the court declined
Just Toy's request to remand the case on the issue of inequitable conduct for OddzOn's failure
to reveal two confidential disclosures to the PTO. See id. (explaining that as a matter of law
OddzOn could not have acted with deceptive intent when it failed to disclose this information).
224. See OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1407 (suggesting that the district court entered summary
judgment sua sponte).
225. See id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (holding that a
summary judgment is appropriate "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against
the party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial")).
226. See id. at 1407-08, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649. For the Ninth Circuit's likelihood of
confusion test, see AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 808,
814 (9th Cir. 1979).
227. OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1408, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649 (stating the basis for the
court's decision).
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believed the two balls could be associated with each other simply
because they both had tails and fins.2s2 The court believed that the
survey artificially adduced this association because it called for
respondents to compare the two "tail and finned" balls at issue in the
case with three additional balls that lacked fins and tails, thereby
contaminating the survey.2
As to the products' packaging, the court agreed that, despite some
shared similarities such as the rectangular shape of the toys'
packaging, there were also many differences that obviated a
likelihood of confusion.30  For instance, "OddzOn's packaging
carried prominent sports stars' pictures and endorsements, while Just
Toys's packaging did not," and both packages employed different
color schemes.2'
Lastly, OddzOn argued that the district court improperly found
that there was no unfair competition under state law because it failed
to address the evidence of design patent and trade dress
infringement.32 The court dismissed this argument in view of its
holding of noninfringement and because the evidence introduced to
the lower court was equally insufficient to support a claim of unfair
competition.2 33
B. Priority Under Section 44 of the Lanham Acte
In In re Hacot-Colombier,25 the court affirmed a Board decision
affirming the PTO's refusal to register appellant Hacot's mark on the
ground that the drawing in the application improperly and materially
altered the character of the mark depicted in the foreign registration
upon which priority was claimed. 6
Hacot filed an application under section 44(d) of the Trademark
Act seeking a United States registration based upon the priority date
of its French application. 7 The PTO examining attorney rejected
228. See id.
229. See id.




233. See id. The court also did not address Just Toys' cross-motion that the district court
.erroneously affirmed the magistrate judge's order compelling production of privileged
documents relating to Just Toys' defense to the charge of willful infringement." See id. at 1408-
09, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. Instead, the court found that the issue was moot in view of
the district court's holding of non-infringement. See id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
234. 15U.S.C.§ 1126(d) (1994).
235. 105 F.3d 616, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
236. See id. at 617,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524-25.
237. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524.
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the application on the ground that its drawing did not depict a
"substantially exact representation of the mark as it appeared in the
foreign registration certificate." Hacot later requested
reconsideration of the refusal and submitted an amended drawing.2
9
The examining attorney rejected the request, making the refusal
final.2 ' The Board affirmed the examining attorney's decision. 24'
On appeal, Hacot argued that its drawing was permissible under
the relevant federal regulations.42 Under section 44(d) of the
Trademark Act, an applicant may receive a priority filing date based
on the filing date of a foreign application if the applicant files its
United States application within six months of filing its original
application for the identical mark in a treaty country.2 s To qualify,
however, an applicant must include a drawing of the mark with its
244U.S. trademark application. Under federal regulation 37 C.F.R. §
2.51, that drawing must be a "substantially exact representation of the
mark as it appears in the drawing in the registration certificate" of the
foreign registration upon which priority is claimed.245
Thus, the court framed the essential inquiry as whether the mark
appearing in the drawing was a "substantially exact representation" of
the mark in the priority application. The court noted that the term
"substantially" in the regulations allows some slight "inconsequential"
variation from the "exact representation" standard.246 For instance,
an applicant may delete nonmaterial informational matter, such as
net weight or content information, from the foreign representation
of an entire label.247 In this case, however, the court agreed with the
Board that Hacot's originally filed mark differed substantially from
the registered foreign mark because it deleted the HACOT-
COLOMBIER H&C house mark and employed a different tree design
248from the one depicted in the foreign registration.





242. See id. at 619, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525-26.
243. See id. at 618,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525 (noting the foreign filing procedures under
15 U.S.C. § 1126(d) (1994)).
244. See id. (discussing 37 C.F.R. § 2.21 (a) (3) (1996)).
245. 37 C.F.R. § 2.21(a)(3) (1996) (emphasis added); see Hacot, 105 F.3d at 618, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
246. See Hacot, 105 F.3d at 618, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525 (providing example of
"inconsequential" variables).
247. See id. at 618-19, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525 (citing United Rum Merchants Ltd. v.
Distillers Corp., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1483-84 (T.T.A.B. 1988)).
248. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524-25 (depicting the three different tree designs
produced by Hacot-Colombier).
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which the PTO also rejected. On appeal, Hacot argued that it could
do so under 37 C.F.R. § 2.72 (a), the federal regulation governing the
amendment of a mark in an application, which specifically provides
that "[a] mendments may not be made to the description or drawing
of the mark if the character of the mark is materially altered. 2 19
Subsection (d) provides that "[i]n applications under section 44 of
the Act, amendments of the description or drawing of the mark may
be permitted only if warranted by the description or drawing of the
mark in the foreign registration certificate." Hacot argued that
section 2.72(d) trumps section 2.72(a) because "as long as the
proposed amendments to the drawing bring the United States
application into closer conformity with the foreign application, such
changes are not material alterations in violation of section 2.72 (a).,,,5,
The court rejected Hacot's argument, citing to a prior Board
ruling that section 2.72 (d) cannot be read so broadly as to permit any
amendment to the drawing in a United States application so long as
the new mark resembles the mark in the foreign registration. 2
Rather, the Board found that subsection (d) must be read in
conjunction with subsection (a), which prohibits an amendment to
the drawing if such an amendment would constitute a material
alteration of the character of the mark. 3 Otherwise, the court
reasoned, subsection (d) would be superfluous.54 An amendment,
even if immaterial, "must bring the United States application closer
to the foreign registration."'' 5 Furthermore, an amendment that
conforms to the foreign registration must still be a nonmaterial
256alteration. Otherwise, the court cautioned, under Hacot's
reasoning an applicant could secure a priority date by filing any mark
with later "potentially numerous" amendments under
section 2.72(d), thereby negating the "same mark" requirement in
249. 37 C.F.R. § 2.72(a) (1996), cited in Hacot, 105 F.3d at 619,41 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1525.
250. 37 C.F.R. § 2.72(d) (1996).
251. Hacot, 105 F.3d at 619, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525-26 (recounting Hacot's
argument).
252. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526. The court stated that the Board's previous
holdings deserve deference. See id. (citing In re Abolio y Rubio S.A.C.I. y G., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1152, 1154-55 (T.TA-B. 1992) (explaining the agency's interpretation by the Board); In
re Dr. Pepper Co., 836 F.2d 508, 510, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(according deference to a reasonable agency interpretation)).
253. See Hacot, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) at 1526 (citing Abolio, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154-55,
in support of the interpretation that "Rule 2.72 includes both a prohibition against material
alterations and a requirement that any alteration conform to the foreign registration").
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 619-20, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526 (noting that otherwise adverse




section 44(d). 7  Borrowing from a previous Board case, the court
noted that under the proper test:
IT]he modified mark must contain what is the essence of the
original mark, and the new form must create the impression of
being essentially the same mark. The general test of whether an
alteration is material is whether the mark would have to be
republished after the alteration in order to fairly present the mark
for purposes of opposition.28
In addition, Hacot argued that its amended alteration was not
material simply because it added the "HACOT-COLOMBIER" house
mark.259 The court acknowledged that when an applicant owns a
registration for a mark it seeks to add to a pending mark, covering
the same goods or services as those listed in the pending application,
the composite resulting from the combination of the two does not
materially alter or affect the mark.260 This is because the newly
formed composite mark does not require a new search or
republicationY26
Here, however, the court found that Hacot's addition of its house
mark remained a material alteration because its original application
covered goods only in International Class 2 (natural dyes for textile
manufacturer), while its house mark covered goods in Classes 20
(pillows), 22 (down feathers), and 24 (sheets, pillow cases, quilt
covers, mattress covers). 262 Because a competitor in the natural dye
industry would not be on notice that Hacot might combine these
marks, the addition of the house mark was a material alteration.26
Further, at the time Hacot filed the original application, its house
mark had not yet matured to registration.2
Finally, Hacot argued that the case was controlled by In re ECCS,
Inc. '2 65 a case decided in the Federal Circuit a year earlier. There, the
applicant filed an application whose drawing page differed from the
257. See id. at 620,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
258. Id. (quoting Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n v. Life-Code Sys., Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 740, 743-
44 (T.TA.B. 1983) (elaborating on the test necessary to comply with Rule 2.72(a) that drawing
can be amended as long as amendment does not alter "initial filing")); see alsoTMEP, supra note
31, § 807.14(a) (noting that "as a general rule, in the case of additions to marks, the addition of
any element which would require a further search would represent a material alteration").
259. SeeHacot, 105 F.3d at 620,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527.
260. See id. (citing In re Nationwide Indus., Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882, 1885 (T.TAB.
1988) (describing a court ruling that allowed applicant to "amend its application to the mark
"SNAP RUST BUSTER," a combination of its original application ("RUST BUSTER") and its





265. 94 F.3d 1578, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2001 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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specimens of use that were filed.2r The applicant later amended the
drawing to conform to the specimens.267 Vacating the Board's refusal
to allow this amendment, the court noted that the application was
"internally inconsistent" and that the examiner should have looked to
the specimens to establish the applicant's actual rights to use the
mark and to resolve the ambiguity.
268
In Hacot, however, the court noted that the original 1992
application contained no ambiguity and it was not until April 22,
1993 (ten months after the original filing) that Hacot supplied the
examiner with a copy of the French registration.2 0 At that point,
when the ambiguity arose, it was well after the six-month window for
foreign priority filing.2 7 0 Thus, to grant Hacot the benefit of the
priority date would allow a party seeking the benefit of foreign
priority to file any drawing, then conform the drawing to the foreign
filing at a later date.Y Characterizing the statutory and regulatory
rules as "not too loose," the court ruled that the Board properly
272enforced them to prevent fraud or improper advantage.
C. A New Look at the Requirement of "Use in Commerce" Under the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988
The court's decision in RIL Productions v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
273
is one of the first to provide trademark practitioners and owners with
some guidance on what quantum and nature of use is necessary to
constitute an "ordinary use in trade" sufficient to support registration
under the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (the "Revision
Act") .74 Prior to the effective date of the Revision Act, "token" use of
266. See id. at 1579, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2002-03.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 1581, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004.
269. See Hacot, 105 F.3d at 621, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.
270. See id. Practically, a foreign application, on which a U.S. Application is based, will
rarely proceed to registration within the six month priority window. Those countries that
generally do issue registrations within six months of an application's original filing include:
Algeria (approximately 2 months), Anguilla (approximately 4 months), Aruba (approximately
2-4 weeks), Burundi (approximately 3 months), Cambodia-Kampuchea (approximately 1
month), Denmark (approximately 3-5 months), Dominican Republic (approximately 3
months), Gibraltar (approximately 1 month), Guernsey (approximately 3 months), Jersey
(approximately 1 week), Laos (approximately 1 month), Mexico (approximately 2 months),
Monaco (approximately 3 months), Netherlands Antilles (approximately 1 month), Rwanda
(approximately 3 months), Syria (approximately 3 months), Tanganyika-Tanzania Republic
(approximately 4 months), and Zanzibar-Tanzania Republic (approximately 4 months).
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. 108 F.3d 1392, No. 96-1096, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3079 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 1997)
(unpublished table decision).
274. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 1946-48 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1994)) [hereinafter "Revision Act"].
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a trademark was sufficient to support a registration.27 5 The Revision
Act replaced the need for a "token use" to reserve marks with a dual
system of registration based on either a registrant's use of, or intent
to use, a mark. Consequently, the Revision Act instituted the
requirement that use of a mark in the "ordinary course of trade" (as
contrasted with mere token use) is necessary to support federal
registration.27 The express language of the Revision Act, however,-- I 278
fails to explain how to apply this standardt. In RI. Productions, the
court found an ideal opportunity to grapple with this issue.
The case reached the Federal Circuit on appeal from a Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board decision granting summary judgment
sustaining Paramount's opposition to an application to register the
mark "THE ROMULANS" for a parlor game.2 9 Appellant White was
the owner of a federal registration for the identical mark "THE
ROMULANS" for live and recorded performances by a vocal and
instrumental group.2 °  White sought to register the mark THE
ROMULANS for a connect-the-dots board game used to promote his
band.28' Paramount Pictures opposed his application based upon use
of the identical term "ROMULANS" to identify an alien race of space
creatures featured in its many "Star Trek" movies and television
series.2 2 The Board granted Paramount's motion for summary
judgment on two grounds, holding that White's mark did not qualify
for trademark registration because the game in question was not a
"good" and his limited distribution of the game was not a "bona fide
,,211use in commerce. On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered
whether the standards for summary judgment had been met on the
issue of "bona fide use.''s  Finding in the affirmative, the court
275. See R.L Productions, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3079, at *6 (stating that the Revision Act
altered the concept of trademark use).
276. See id.; see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 19:01[5] (discussing the impact of the
Revision Act on registration).
277. See RIL Productions, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3079, at *6 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994)).
278. See id. (stating that the Federal Circuit has not yet developed any bright line rules
regarding "ordinary use in trade").
279. Seeid.at*l.
280. See id at *3 n.1. Paramount Pictures had earlier unsuccessfully opposed White's
application to register the mark "THE ROMULANS" for "entertainment services, namely, live
and recorded performances by a vocal and instrumental group .... " Id. (citing Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. Romulan Invasions, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1897 (T.TAB. 1988)).
281. Seeid.at*2.
282. See id. at *2-3. The Board considered and ruled in Paramount's favor on the issue of
whether Paramount had standing to oppose the mark. See id. at *4 n.2.
283. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. White, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1768, 1772-76 (T.TAB.
1994).
284. See RI. Productions, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3079, at *4-5 (addressing Paramount's
argument that the connect-the-dots game does "not meet the requirements of bona fide sales of
a good in commerce needed for trademark registration").
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deemed it unnecessary to consider the subsequent issue of whether
the game constituted a "good" within the meaning of the Lanham
Act.
285
The court relied on the legislative history of the Revision Act for
guidance on the quantum and nature of use required to satisfy the
requirement of "bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of
trade., 26  The court also applied case law setting forth minimum
requirements under the old "token use" system, 28 7 on the theory that
uses that did not qualify under the token-use system (e.g., "sporadic,
casual, and nominal use") clearly did not qualify under the newer,
28
more stringent "bona fide use" system. Only a use sufficient to
reflect "a continual effort to create a viable business in the goods so marked'
rises to a level necessary to satisfy the use requirements of the new
Revision Act. 289
In order to evaluate the propriety of the Board's grant of summary
judgment in Paramount's favor, the Federal Circuit conducted an
independent evaluation of the facts alleged by White to support
registration of his application!" White testified that he generally
distributed his game for free at band performances or, occasionally,
to interested fans by mail29' Sale estimates indicated that only 20-25
games per year were actually sold, at prices ranging between $.25 to
$1.00 each, and never more than at his own cost.28 2 At best, White's
annual sales estimates approximated no more than $12.50 a year.29'
The evidence reflected that the volume of appellant's sales were far
below what would be typical in the wider board/parlor game
industry.8 4  The circuit court affirmed the Board's finding that
White's use of "THE ROMULANS" mark simply did not qualify as a
285. See id at *5.
286. Id. at *6-7 (discussing House and Senate reports on the Lanham Act). Section 45 of
the Lanham Act defines the term "use in commerce" as "the bona fide use of a mark in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1994).
287. See R.L Productions, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3079, at *7-8 (citing Bellanca Aircraft Corp.
v. Bellanca Aircraft Eng'g, Inc., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 158, 167 (T.TA.B. 1976) and Mastic, Inc. v.
Mastic Corp., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 699, 701 (T.TAB. 1986)).
288. See id. at *7-9.
289. Id. at *8 (quoting LaMaur, Inc. v. International Pharm. Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 612,
617 (T.TA.B. 1978)) (emphasis added).
290. See id. at *5.
291. See id. at*2.
292. See id. at *2, *9 (stating that White did not keep business records of the games he sold).
Appellant also states that he gives the games away for free if he is "in a good mood." Id. at *9.
293. See id. at *9.
294. See id. (stating that White's volume of use, i.e., gross income from the games, is not
typical for his particular industry insofar as it did not constitute a "continual effort to create a
viable business in the goods so worked") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"6use in commerce" as contemplated by the Revision Act.'
D. A Consideration of Single Color Marks
In In re Hudson News Co.29 the Federal Circuit upheld, without
opinion, a Board decision that two applications for the color blue for
"retail store services featuring newspapers, magazines, books, snack
foods, clothing, film and other sundries"27 were neither functional
nor inherently distinctive.29
Hudson filed two applications that included descriptions and
nonpictorial drawings of the marks sought to be registered.2 The
first description portrayed the marks as "a distinctive trade dress
consisting of the color blue utilized as a motif in association with the
store name and other trade dress elements such as carpeting, neon
lighting, publication(s), display panels and surrounds, shelving and
employee uniforms."' The second description read:
The mark is a distinctive trade dress composed of a cool bluish,
clean and salubrious newsstand shopping environment. The blue
motif is created and enhanced by blue neon lighting associated
with the store name and publication(s) displays, blue carpeting,
blue accents, and blue employee uniforms. The blue motif is
further enhanced by extensive use of clear, acrylic plastic shelving
and coverings for displays which both reflect and allow for the
passage of the reflected bluish light throughout.30'
The drawing pages for the applications indicated the notation "no
drawing" where the mark normally appears and included the
statement "It]he mark is nonfunctional, inherently distinctive and is
used as trade dress in applicant's retail newsstand stores."' 2  The
examiner refused registration for both applications on the grounds
that (1) the matter sought to be registered was de jure functional; and
(2) even if the matter sought to be registered was not de jure
functional, the trade dress was not inherently distinctive. The
applicant appealed, arguing that its trade dress was registrable under
the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana.se3
4
295. See id.
296. 114 F.3d 1207, Nos. 97-1050, 97-1051, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15556 (Fed. Cir.June 12,
1997) (unpublished table decision).
297. In re Hudson News Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1916 (T.T.A.B. 1996) (citing
Application Serial No. 74-441,602).
298. See id. at 1924.
299. See id. at 1916.
300. Id. (quotingApplication Serial No. 74-441,602).
301. Id. (quotingApplication Serial No. 74-441,603).
302. Id.
303. See id.
304. See id. (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081
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The examiner reasoned that the applications described the marks
as consisting primarily of the color blue, which, as a common
decorating color used in retail stores and for which there is a
competitive need, is de jure functional3 05 The examiner also argued
that the applicant's blue trade dress was dejure functional because it
created a soothing, calming environment that competitors should be
free to recreate in their stores.s  The examiner noted further that
even if the marks were not de jure functional, they were not inherently
distinctive because, "as a color mark" they would require secondary
meaning for protection.07
The Board held that the marks were not de jure functional because
the examiner's evidence of record did not indicate that the color
blue had any utilitarian purpose.3 8 Nor was there evidence in the
record clarifying how registering the applicant's "blue motif' would
hinder competition. 9 The Board noted that even if the particular
blue is a soothing color, a blue interior would not necessarily benefit
a retail newsstand.3 '0 The evidence did not suggest that a newsstand
(or any retail store) with a blue interior would attract more customers
and/or increase sales.3 ' Simply because "people are soothed by or
feel good in a blue environment does not necessarily mean that these
people, as customers in applicant's newsstand, will buy more
products. 312 Thus, the examiner failed to prove that a blue interior
of a retail store is the best or one of the few superior designs that is
desirable for competitors to use-the appropriate test for de jure
functionality.
313
The Board contrasted this case from others where colors have been
held to clearly form a function-for example the use of the color
coral to make ear plugs more visible to allow for easier and quicker
employee safety checks.1 4  The Board also disagreed with the
examiner that certain colors may be functional if they have some sort
(1992), which applicant cited in support of registering trade dress).
305. See id. at 1917.
306. See id.
307. See id. (stating that examiner's interpretation of Supreme Court's language in Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (1995), suggests that color
marks require secondary meaning in order to be afforded protection).
308. See id. at 1920.
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See id. ("On the evidence of record, we fail to see how the color blue has a utilitarian
purpose and/or why registering this applicant's 'blue motif' would hinder competition.").
312. Id.
313. See id. (citing Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1120, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).




of psychological effect in light of the examiner's failure to produce




Last, the Board noted that the purpose of the publication
requirement was to allow applicant's competitors an opportunity to
oppose his application if they believed registration would hinder
competition."6 Applicant's competitors would be in a better position
to introduce evidence reflecting marketplace realities than the
PTO. 317
On the issue of inherent distinctiveness, the court noted that the
Supreme Court in Two Pesos did not determine the proper test for
evaluating whether trade dress is inherently distinctive.3'8 The Board
noted that the Federal Circuit frames the test as whether a trade dress
is "a 'common' basic shape or design, whether it [is] unique or
unusual in a particular field, [or] whether it [is] a mere refinement
of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a
particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or
ornamentation for the goods.""1 9 More simply stated by the court, the
appropriate test is "whether or not the trade dress is of such a design
that a buyer will immediately rely on it to differentiate the product
from those of competing manufacturers." 29
The Board found that the dress at issue in this case was "quite
pedestrian" and not "striking" or "unusual" as the applicant alleged.321
The Board did not believe that consumers would immediately
recognize that the blue motif trade dress identified the store's
services.'2 Rather, the Board concluded that consumers would view
the trade dress as nothing more than interior decoration and dismiss
the "motif' of carpeting, neon lighting, plastic display racks,
uniforms, and unidentified "accents" because such designs could be
315. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Farmhand Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 101, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 252.
264-65 (S.D. Iowa 1982), affd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that the color green is
functional because farmers like to have farm accessories color coordinated with their tractor);
Norwich Pharm. Co. v. Sterling Drug Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 n.7, 123 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 372, 375
n.7 (2d Cir. 1959) (inferring that the purported "psychosomatic effect" of the color pink for a
stomach upset remedy might be characterized as functional); Doeskin Prods., Inc. v. Levinson,
132 F. Supp. 180, 183-84, 105 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 329, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (assessing that
psychological reaction to pastel shades in facial tissues create mental impression of "softness").
316. See Hudson, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920-21.
317. Seeid.at 1921.
318. See id,
319. Id. at 1922 (quoting Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344
196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289, 291 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (illustrating the test used by other courts to
resolve issues of inherent distinctiveness)).
320. Id. (quoting Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
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found at a number of retail establishments.3 The Board concluded
that decorating in one color does not transform a trade dress into an
inherently distinctive mark. 4
As an aside, the court noted in a footnote that the debate
continues over the holding in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,2 as
to whether single-color marks may be inherently distinctive, or
whether they require secondary meaning for protection.326 Some
courts have held that single-color marks cannot be inherently
distinctive and necessarily require a showing of secondary meaning7
Were a court to hold that a single color could be inherently
distinctive, candidates for such marks would likely have to substitute a
product's common color with a unique, unusual, or unexpected
color. Examples of inherently-distinctive single color marks could
include bright red automobile tires, purple orange juice, pink
hammers, navy blue butter, and fluorescent green coffee.
328
E. The Scope of the Board's Authority to Impose Sanctions
In Carolina Exports International, Inc. v. Bulgarim  the court
addressed the scope of the Board's authority to impose sanctions on a
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. 514 U.S. 159, 162, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1162 (1995) (holding that a mark
consisting of a color alone can act as a source identifier and be registered under the Lanham
Act).
326. See Hudson, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923 n.17 (discussing Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162, which held that color alone is protectable and registrable).
327. See Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 408, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1942, 1946-47 (2d Cir. 1997) ("As an element of trade dress ... we observe that color is
never inherently distinctive, but is capable of identifying a product's source and may be a
protected trademark only when it has attained secondary meaning and has come to be
associated in the consuming public's mind with a single source of origin."); Carillon Importers
Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Group, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1559, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ("As a matter of policy,
color alone is not protected as trade dress, unless it has acquired a secondary meaning."), afJd,
112 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Knitwares, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1008, 36
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1746 (2d Cir. 1995) (interpreting Qualitex as standing for the
proposition that color alone may not be inherently distinctive); Mana Prods., Inc. v. Columbia
Cosmetics Mfg., Inc., 65 F.3d 1063, 1070, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1176, 1181 (2d Cir. 1995)
("While there is no fixed rule for the amount of proof necessary to prove secondary meaning,
in the case of a color mark for a trade dress the burden is heavy because color marks by their
very nature are not generally distinctive.").
328. See Kevin M. Jordan & Lynn M. Jordan, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.: The
Unanswered Question-Can Color Ever be Inherently Distinctive?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 371,396 (1995)
("[I]f a manufacturer sold potato chips, dyed purple, under the name of 'Psychedelic Spuds,'
should it not be able to secure trademark protection for the purple color as soon as the product
reaches consumers . . . ."); see also Jonathan Hudis, Removing the Boundaries of Color, 86
TRADEMARK REP. 1, 7 (1996) (explaining that the Qualitex decision supports the registrability of
inherently distinctive color marks, without first proving secondary meaning).
329. 108 F.3d 1394, No. 96-5082, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4701 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 1997)
(unpublished table decision).
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disobedient party in an opposition proceeding!" Bulgari, owner of
the famous "BULGARI" mark, opposed Carolina's application to
register the identical mark "BULGARI" for "wine and spirits.
During the discovery phase of the opposition, Bulgari sought
information regarding Carolina's compliance with governmental
regulations.32 When Carolina failed to respond to its discovery
requests, Bulgari filed a motion to compel which was granted by the
Board."
In response to Carolina's failure to comply with the Board's Order,
Bulgari sought, and the Board imposed, sanctions tailored to the
subject of Carolina's disobedience-namely, its failure to provide
discovery about governmental compliance or noncompliance. The
Board chose to accept as conclusively proven that Carolina's
"BULGARI" wines and spirits did not comply with the governing
regulatory laws. This fact formed the basis for Bulgari's amended
Notice of Opposition and its later successful motion for summary
judgment."'
On appeal, Carolina argued that the Board erred in imposing
sanctions for two reasons. Carolina claimed that though it had
received a copy of the Board's Order compelling production, it never
received a copy of Bulgari's original moving papers and thus could
not be sanctioned for noncompliance.3 6 In the alternative, Carolina
opposed sanctions because they had the ultimate effect of dismissing
Carolina's case."'
The court did not agree with either of Carolina's claims."
According to the court, Trademark Rule 2.120 (g) (1)33 empowers the
Board with discretionary authority to impose sanctions on a party
who has failed to comply with a discovery order, including, in
particular, an order compelling discovery.4 Pursuant to FED. R. Civ.
330. See id. at *36 (discussing the Board's decision to grant sanctions for failure to comply
with Board's discovery order).
331. See id. at *1.
332. See id. at * 1-3.
333. See id. at *2.
334. See id.
335. See id. at *2-3.
336. See id. at *3 (noting Carolina's objection to sanctions based on the fact that it did not
receive notice pursuant to FED. R. Cwv. P. 37).
337. See id.
338. See id. at *4-5 (noting the Court's reasoning for rejecting Carolina's arguments).
339. 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(g) (1996).
340. See Bulgaii, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4701, at *4-5 (noting that the Board did not
misinterpret the law in providing sanctions for noncompliance with the discovery order).
Indeed, the Board is empowered to impose sanctions for failure to comply with an order only
when the Board has issued an order relating to discovery (i.e., an order compelling discovery or
a protective order) and the order has been violated. See TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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P. 37(b) (2) and Trademark Rule 2.120(g) (1), a party subjects itself to
sanctions for failure to obey an order of the Board.34 ' The circuit
court's review of the record led it to conclude that Carolina had
received and purposely ignored the Board's order, and Carolina did
not bother to seek reconsideration. $  As such, the court concluded,
the Board's imposition of sanctions was appropriate.3
The court was equally unpersuaded by Carolina's second argument
regarding an alleged abuse of discretion in the Board's selection of
sanctions.$4 Trademark Rule 2.120(g) (1) gives the Board discretion
to enter sanctions, including the entry of orders permitted in FED. R.
CIV. P. 37(b) (2).-"s In selecting the appropriate sanctions, the Board
followed the express language of FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b) (2) (A) by
establishing the facts relating to its discovery order as conclusively346
proven. The fact that the Board's sanctions ultimately led to an
adverse grant of summary judgment did not affect the court's
perception of the validity of the sanctions. 7 As the court recognized,
a contrary result would allow Carolina (and likely encourage others)
to benefit from the "blatant disregard of an order to avoid a grant of
summaryjudgment.' 48 The court concluded that there was no abuse
of discretion because Carolina refused to produce the compelled
information. M9
MANUAL OF PROCEDURE § 527.01 (1995) [hereinafter TBMP] (citing MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v.
Arrow-M Corp., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 952, 954 (T.T.A.B. 1979) (refusing to recognize a party's
statement regarding the opposition's noncompliance with discovery requests as a sufficient
basis for sanctions under Rule 2.120(c))); General Sealer Corp. v. H.H. Robertson Co., 193
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 384, 384 (T.T.A.B. 1976) (construing motion for summaryjudgment as motion
to compel discovery for purpose of permitting Board to impose sanctions for failure to comply);
Spa Int'l, Inc. v. European Health Spa, Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 747, 747 (T.TA.B. 1975)
(ruling that Board cannot impose sanctions under Rule 2.120(c) when the party seeking
sanctions has not followed proper procedure for obtaining order compelling such discovery);
Johnson & Johnson v. Diamond Med., Inc., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 615, 616 (T.TAB. 1974)
(stating that the party must willfully fail to comply with Board's Order permitting discovery as
prerequisite to imposition of sanctions by Board)).
341. See Bulgari, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4701, at *4.
342. See id. at *4-5.
343. See id. at *5.
344. See id. (finding no abuse of discretion in Board's decision to award sanctions it deemed
appropriate).
345. See id. Rule 527.01 of the TBMP lists the sanctions which may be entered by the Board
as follows: "striking all or part of the pleadings of the disobedient party; refusing to allow the
disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses; prohibiting the
disobedient party from introducing designated matters into evidence; and entering judgment
against the disobedient party." TBMP, supra note 340, § 527.01. The Board does not have the
authority to hold any person in contempt, or to award any expenses, including attorneys' fees,
to any party. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.120(g) (1), 2.127(f) (1996); TBMP, supra note 340, § 502.06.
346. See Bulgari, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4701, at *5.
347. See id. at *5-6.
348. Id.
349. See id. at *6.
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Carolina raised two additional unsuccessful challenges to the
Board's ruling on appeal. Carolina argued that the Board erred in
granting Bulgari leave to amend its pleadings because Carolina
sustained great prejudice due to the Board's decision to grant
summary judgment in Bulgari's favor based upon those amended
pleadings.'-' The court concluded that any prejudice to Carolina
related solely to its inability to defend itself against a conclusively
proven fact, rather than the timing of Bulgari's motion.351
Carolina also found fault with the Board's grant of summary
judgment based solely upon Bulgari's amended Notice of Opposition
rather than upon a "claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim."3 52  The
court disagreed, holding that an amended pleading, including an
amended notice of opposition, does not preclude a grant of summary
judgment.353 The court therefore affirmed the Board's decision in its
entirety.M
F. Priority of Use and Inequitable Conduct
In Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Network Inc.,"5 one of the few
cases involving a Federal Circuit reversal of a Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board holding, the court addressed issues of priority of use
and inequitable conduct raised in a cancellation proceeding
involving the "SHADOW TRAFFIC" service mark.3- As the court
acknowledged upfront, the factual background of the case is "as
congested as the streets of New York or Philadelphia during rush
hour.
, , 57
The "SHADOW TRAFFIC" mark was coined and first used by a
Pennsylvania corporation ("SNI-PA") to identify its Philadelphia-area
traffic-reporting services in 1976.s5 In 1979, the principals of SNI-PA
entered into a joint venture with New York-based individuals to
350. See id.
351. See id. at *7 ("The question of prejudice is largely dependent upon the timing of the
motion to amend.") (citing Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1038,
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau,
825 F.2d 647, 653 n.6 (2d Cir. 1987) (permitting leave to amend an answer where amended
counterclaims required only limited discovery and thus did not constitute abuse of the
discovery process in an attempt to force settlement).
352. See Bulgari, 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 4701, at *7-8.
353. See id. (citing Marmark Ltd. v. Nutrexpa S.A., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843, 1845
(T.T.A.B. 1989) (acknowledging that a summary judgment has been granted on the basis of
amended pleadings)).
354. See id.
355. 104 F.3d 336,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
356. See id. at 337-38, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370-72.
357. Id. at 337,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
358. See id.
19981 1535
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1491
establish "SHADOW TRAFFIC" traffic-reporting services in the New
York metropolitan area ("SNI-NJ"). 3-9 Though the principals ended
their joint venture relationship in 1981, the remaining entities, SNI-
PA and SNI-NJ, agreed to use concurrently the "SHADOW TRAFFIC"
mark and to participate jointly in the solicitation of advertising'
60
In 1984, SNI-PA was acquired by another company and its name
was changed to Shadow Traffic Network, Inc. ("STNI") .6' STNI's use
of the "SHADOW TRAFFIC" mark continued thereafter without
362change.
36
In 1985, SNI-NJ filed an application to register the mark
"SHADOW TRAFFIC," claiming ownership since 1979, and
substantially exclusive use of the mark since 197963 SNI-NJ's
application made no mention of SNI-PA's prior use or STNI's
ongoing use of the identical mark. 6"
In 1986, SNI-NJ was itself acquired by Shadow Traffic Network New
Jersey (STNNJ), an entity comprising owners and directors of STNI.3"
STNNJ financed the acquisition through a bank loan secured
through the assets of STNNJ (which included the registered service
mark "SHADOW TRAFFIC") and some stockholdings owned by
individual investors in STNI.3r Although STNI was a party to the
transaction, it did not pledge any of its assets to secure the loan. 7
In 1990, STNNJ defaulted on the bank loan and the pledged assets
of SNI-NJ, including the "SHADOW TRAFFIC" registration, were sold
to a third party named Citi Traffic.
In 1991, STNI was purchased by Metro Traffic. 36 ' The purchase
included SNI-PA's common law service mark rights in the SHADOW
TRAFFIC mark.37° Sometime thereafter, Metro Traffic petitioned to
cancel Citi Traffic's "SHADOW TRAFFIC" registration on grounds of
priority and fraudulent procurement.37' Though the Board held that
Metro Traffic had established priority of use, it also held that this





363. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370-71.
364. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
365. See id. at 337-38, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.








used for the purchase of STI-NJ.37 The Board also concluded that
Metro Traffic had failed to prove fraudulent procurement by clear
and convincing evidence. 373
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found clear error in the Board's
finding that Metro Traffic did not show priority of use.37 4
Furthermore, the circuit court determined that although the Board
correctly found that SNI-PA had first used the "SHADOW TRAFFIC"
mark, the Board erred in its holding that those rights were
relinquished by virtue of the 1990 default.75 According to the
Federal Circuit, this error derived from the Board's failure to
recognize that STNI and STNNJ were separate entities and its
resulting confusion about which entity had defaulted on the loan.
The court reasoned that because STNI never pledged any assets to
the bank, it did not forfeit any assets upon default.3 7 7 The court
therefore vacated the Board's decision on priority of use.378
The court emphasized, however, that reversing the Board's
decision would not "automatically entitle Metro Traffic to
cancellation."'3 " If the Board were to find that STNI and STNNJ held
themselves out to the public as a single operation, it could also find
that STNI's prior common law rights in the "SHADOW TRAFFIC"
mark merged into STNNJ's registration during the period of joint
operation and control."" The court remanded the case to the Board
for consideration of this issue."
The court did let stand, however, the Board's rejection of Metro
Traffic's claim of fraudulent procurement.3,2 Metro Traffic based its
allegations of fraudulent inducement on three allegedly false
statements concerning ownership, substantially exclusive use, and the
rights of others to use the mark contained in the declaration
accompanying SNI-NJ's application for the "SHADOW TRAFFIC"
mark.83 The court found no clear error in the Board's conclusion
that these statements, though false, were not fraudulent. 4
372. See id.
373. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371-72.




378. See Ud (reasoning that since STNI did not pledge its common law rights to the service
mark, it did not lose them upon loan default).
379. Id. at 340,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
380. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372-73.
381. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
382. See id. at 341, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
383. See id. at 340, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
384. See id. at 341, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373 (determining that declarant did not
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Like the Board had before it, the court drew a distinction between
a false statement occasioned by a misunderstanding, inadvertence,
negligent omission and the like, and a fraudulent statement made
with the willful intent to deceive."" Upon review of the testimony, the
Board concluded that the three challenged statements stemmed not
from an intent to deceive, but rather from confusion over the
complex factual circumstances and ongoing cooperative relationships
of the Philadelphia and New Jersey "SHADOW TRAFFIC" entities.
The court deferred to the Board's findings and declined to overturn
this aspect of its opinion on appeal. s7
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Federal Circuit's 1997 decisions lend insightful analysis
to a number of important procedural and substantive trademark
issues. Its decisions add a wealth of direction to the ever-growing
body of trademark law.
understand legal implications of statements).
385. See id. at 340, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373 (citing Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 209
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1033, 1044 (T.T.A.B. 1981), stating that false misrepresentation made without
willful intent does not constitute fraud)).
386. See id. at 341, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373.
387. See id.
1538
